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ABSTRACT
This paper contains the chapters on welfare economics, morality, and the law from a general,
forthcoming book, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (Harvard University Press, 2003). I
begin in chapter 26 with a discussion of the normative foundations of economic analysis, namely,
the subject of welfare economics. I also describe notions of morality and fairness, which play an
important, if dominant, role in much normative discourse about law, and I discuss the connections
between welfare economics and morality. A theme of this discussion is that notions of morality have
functional aspects, and that, for a complex of reasons, they also take on importance in their own
right to individuals.  
Then in chapter 27, I consider the observed relationship between law and morality, and
comment on what might be thought to be the optimal relationship between law and morality.
In chapter 28, I discuss issues concerning income distributional equity and the law, including
the question of whether the distributional effects of legal rules should influence their selection. The
answer to this question will be a qualified no, given that society has an income tax system that can serve
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In this chapter, I first discuss the framework of welfare economics that, as sketched in 
Chapter 1, has been used throughout the book in undertaking normative analysis of law. 
Then I define and describe the role of notions of morality and, at the end of the chapter, 
relate these notions to welfare economics.
1 This will enable us, in the succeeding chapter, 
to discuss the relationship between law and morality and to understand the connections 
between normative evaluation of legal rules that is based on welfare economics and that 
relying, at least in part, on ideas of what is right and just.  
 
1. Welfare Economics 
1.1 General framework. The term welfare economics refers to a general 
framework for normative analysis, that is, for evaluating different choices that society 
may make. Under the framework, the social evaluation of a situation consists of two 
elements: first, determination of the utility of each individual in the situation, and second, 
amalgamation of individuals’ utilities in some way. I will now discuss each of these 
elements. 
1.2 Individual utility. The utility of a person is an indicator of his well-being, 
whatever  might constitute that well-being.
2 Thus, not only do food, shelter, and all the 
material and hedonistic pleasures and pains affect utility, but so also does the satisfaction, 
or lack thereof, of a person’s aesthetic sensibilities, his altruistic and sympathetic feelings 
for others, his sense of what constitutes fair treatment for himself and for others (a point 
that will be of particular importance for us), and so forth. It is important to note too that if 
there is uncertainty about the future and thus about the utility that individuals will turn 
                                                 
     
1I am, of course, well aware that, in dealing with the general subject of morality, which has been intensively 
and continuously debated for more than two thousand years, no position that a writer advances is likely to be 
viewed as free from difficulty. A writer can, however, endeavor to be clear, especially about separating the 
description of moral notions from the prescription of behavior and social decisions on the basis of their 
agreement or disagreement with moral notions.  
     
2More precisely, a utility indicator or utility function attaches a number to each situation in which a person 
could find himself, and in such a way that higher numbers are associated with higher well-being. Thus, if 
situation x is preferred to situation y by a person, the utility associated with x must be higher than that associated 
with y. For instance, 2 might be the utility of x and 1 that of y, or  20 that of x and 12 that of y.  Many different 
possible utility functions can represent the same ordering of possible situations by an individual according to his 
well-being. However, for concreteness, the reader might sometimes find  it convenient to imagine (whether or 
not it is true) that there is a measurable level of a chemical, or of electrical activity in a region of the brain, that is 
higher the higher the person’s reported well-being is, and that this particular quantity serves as utility.   
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out to experience, individuals will have a prospective evaluation of their well-being, 
which can be expressed as their expected utility, that is, as probability-discounted utility.
3 
As the reader knows, this has the implication that the existence of insurance may benefit 
individuals because insurance raises their expected utility. 
It is apparent, then, that the idea of utility is of encompassing generality; by 
definition, utility is advanced by anything that raises a person’s well-being.  
1.3 Amalgamation of utilities through the social welfare function. According 
to the welfare economic framework, the social evaluation of situations is assumed to be 
based on individual well-being. In particular, it is presumed that the social evaluation, 
labeled social welfare, depends positively on each and every individual’s utility – social 
welfare is raised when any individual’s utility increases -- and does not depend on factors 
apart from their utilities.
4  
There is a vast multitude of ways of aggregating individual utilities into a measure 
of social welfare, and no single way is endorsed under welfare economics. One possible 
measure of social welfare is that of classical utilitarianism, the sum of individuals’ 
utilities. Under other measures, not just the sum but also the distribution of utilities 
generally matters, and more equal distributions of utility may be superior to less equal 
distributions.
5 Under welfare economics, the assumption is not that the evaluation of 
social states is guided by one particular view about the proper way of amalgamating 
individuals’ utilities (within the general class of ways of so doing), but only that there is 
some way of doing this. 
                                                 
     
3A person must have some way of evaluating situations involving uncertainty, because the supposition is that 
he can always state his well-being and state a preference for one situation over another, and some situations 
involve uncertainty. Thus, the statement in the text that a person has a prospective evaluation is merely an 
observation about his having well-formed preferences, not a distinct claim about their nature. However, that a 
person’s prospective evaluation of an uncertain situation can be expressed as a probability-discounted sum of 
utilities -- as an expected utility -- is a distinct claim about preferences, and it can be proved under very weak 
assumptions (see in particular Savage 1972), but these assumptions need not detain us here. 
     
4To express the framework formally, suppose that there are n individuals, and let the utility of the first 
individual be denoted U1, that of the second U2, and so forth. Also, let x stand for an exhaustive description of a 
situation. Then social welfare, W(x), can be written as W(x) = F(U1(x), U2(x),...,Un(x)). Here, W(x) > W(xN) is 
interpreted to mean that situation x is socially preferred to situation xN. As noted, it is assumed that W(x) increases 
as each person’s utility (U1, U2, etc.) increases. It should be noticed that social welfare, W(x), is influenced by x 
only insofar as x affects the utilities of individuals; it is solely the utilities of individuals that determine social 
welfare. It should also be observed that the mathematical form of the social welfare function W depends on the 
utility functions Ui that are chosen to represent the well-being of individuals; if, for instance, for person i we 
altered the utility function Ui by doubling it to Ui*(x) = 2Ui(x), then W would be modified such that half of Ui* 
would play the role of Ui in W.  
     
5For example, suppose that W equals the sum of square roots of utilities, and consider a situation where there 
are two individuals, and each has the same utility, 100. Then social welfare is 20, namely, %100 + %100 = 10 + 
10. This equal distribution of utility is superior to the unequal distribution where one person has utility of 50 and 
the other 150, in which case social welfare is 19.32 (for  %50 + %150 = 7.07 + 12.25), and this distribution is 
superior to the extreme distribution in which one person has all the utility of 200, in which case social welfare is 
14.14 (for %200 = 14.14).   
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Comments. (a) Distribution of income. Considerations about equity in the 
distribution of income can be expressed in the measure of social welfare. Notably, the 
distribution of income affects the distribution of utilities, and this distribution, as just 
stated above, may influence social welfare in any way. For further discussion of why the 
distribution of income affects social welfare, see section 1 of chapter 28. 
(b) Exclusion of factors unrelated to individuals’ utilities. The assumption that 
social welfare does not depend on factors apart from the utilities of individuals can be 
formally defined in the following way. Suppose that in two different social situations, say 
x and y, every single individual says, “I am as happy in situation x as I am in situation y.” 
Then situations x and y must be accorded the same level of social welfare.
6 (If this x and 
this y were said to possess different levels of social welfare, it would have to be that 
something apart from the profile of utilities across the population matters to the 
evaluation of the social situations.) I will sometimes call this kind of measure of social 
welfare, the kind that is studied under welfare economics, a utility-based measure of 
social welfare in order to differentiate it from a measure of social welfare that depends on 
something else as well.
7 
(c)_Exclusion of “objective” notions of well-being as the basis of social welfare. 
Consider an objective notion of well-being, for example the notion that any enjoyment 
derived from the unhappiness of others ought not count as objective utility.  Such an 
objective notion of utility cannot be employed as the basis of social welfare under welfare 
economics, given the assumption that social welfare is a function solely of individuals’ 
(subjective) utilities.  
 
2. Notions of Morality Described  
2.1 Definition of a notion of morality. There are numerous conceptions of what 
actions are said to be correct, right, fair, just, or moral (I will use these words 
interchangeably, for convenience). These conceptions are, at least implicitly, ways of 
evaluating situations; the correct, right, fair, or moral behavior or action is ranked above 
the incorrect, wrong, unfair, or immoral behavior or action. 
Some conceptions of fairness concern equity in the distribution of things. Thus if 
there is a cake to be divided between two individuals, it might be said that it is generally 
right for each to be allocated an equal share. Many such ideas of fair distribution may be 
viewed as methods of evaluation based on the distribution of utilities of individuals. (In 
the cake example, the idea of fair division of the cake corresponds to a distribution of the 
cake such that each individual derives the same utility from his portion of the cake.) Any 
idea of distributional fairness can be expressed as a utility-based social welfare function 
and is thus comprehended under the framework of welfare economics. 
Other conceptions of fairness and morality involve factors distinct from, or in 
addition to, the distribution of utility among individuals. For example, it is said that if a 
person makes a promise, it is correct for him to keep it; that if one person wrongly injures 
                                                 
     
6Formally, the assumption is as follows. Suppose in two situations x and y, for each individual i, U1(x) = 
U1(y). Then W(x) = W(y). This assumption may easily be verified to be equivalent to the assumption (see note 4) 
that social welfare W(x) may be expressed in the form W(x) = F(U1(x), U2(x),...,Un(x)). 
     
7In economics, what I am calling a utility-based measure of social welfare is usually called individualistic, or 
sometimes welfaristic.   
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another, fairness requires that he compensate the victim for his losses (the classic notion 
of corrective justice); or that if a person commits a bad act, it is right that he be punished 
in proportion to the gravity of the act. On reflection, the reader can verify that these 
examples of nondistributional moral notions share a basic feature: They are all means of 
evaluating behavior, and thus social situations, that do not depend at all, or at least do 
not depend exclusively, on the utilities of individuals -- they depend on something else. 
Promises are supposed be kept not because, or not only because, this raises the well-being 
of those who make and benefit from promises (even though that may generally happen); 
compensation is supposed to be paid for harm wrongly done not because, or not only 
because, this will insure victims, discourage future harmful behavior, and keep the peace 
(even though these things will tend to occur); punishment is supposed to be imposed in 
proportion to the seriousness of the bad acts not because, or not only because, this will 
lead to reasonable deterrence of bad acts and raise potential victims’ utility (even though 
that may generally happen). Rather, promise-keeping, compensation for wrongs, and 
correct punishment are important, as moral notions, because they are intrinsically good, 
or for some underlying reason (such as that they are in accord with a system of natural 
justice), but in any case not solely, if at all, because of their effects on the well-being of 
individuals.
8 I will henceforth focus on these nondistributional ideas of fairness and, for 
expositional ease, will mean by fairness or morality, and the like, a nondistributional 
conception.
9  
Now to say that a moral notion is a means of evaluating behavior that does not 
depend exclusively on the utilities of individuals is not enough to define what is usually 
meant by a moral notion. Consider a rule of behavior such as “Do not wear a hat when 
butterflies can be seen.” This principle of behavior does not depend on individuals’ 
utilities, but the principle is not one that we would call moral. The reason is that what is 
said to be a moral notion is one that is accompanied by particular types of sentiments on 
our part, so a second element of a definition of a moral notion that comports with 
ordinary usage of that term is that a moral notion is associated with these sentiments.
10 I 
now turn to a description of the sentiments, of the psychological aspects of moral notions. 
                                                 
     
8Formally, a notion of morality that does not depend exclusively on the utilities of individuals is associated 
with a social welfare function W(x) that is not individualistic, cannot be written in the form F(U1(x), 
U2(x),...,Un(x)). That is, given W, there must exist situations x and y such that for each individual i, U1(x) = U1(y), 
yet W(x) does not equal W(y).  
     
9Although I am calling notions of fairness that do not depend exclusively on utilities nondistributional, some 
writers occasionally use the term “distribution” in connection with these notions. For example, corrective justice 
requires that a wrongdoer compensate his victim, and a writer might say that the compensation paid is a matter of 
just distribution. I am reserving the term distribution to refer to the allocation of utilities across the population 
and hope that the reader will not be confused by my usage (which is not idiosyncratic). 
     
10One observation about moral notions (but this is not part of the definition in the text) is that they apply 
primarily where the well-being of more than one person is at issue. Promise-keeping, note, involves a promisor 
and a promisee; punishment involves a wrongdoer and a victim; and so forth. A principle that affects only one 
individual (such as “go on a diet”) would not tend to fit with our use of the term “moral.” (There are some 
exceptions, having to do with ideas of prudence, temperance, and self-control, but the reasons for these principles 
having the attributes of the other moral principles are, it can be argued, similar to those that will be adduced for 
the latter, conventional moral principles.)  
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2.2 Definition continued: psychological attributes associated with notions of 
morality. One psychological attribute associated with what we tend to call a notion of 
morality is a feeling of virtue, of pleasure of a type, that a person experiences when he 
obeys a notion; and an opposite psychological attribute is a feeling of guilt or remorse, of 
displeasure, that a person suffers when he disobeys a notion. Thus, when a person keeps a 
promise, he may feel virtue, and if he breaks a promise, he may feel guilt. 
Moreover, it is not just the individual who acts morally or who fails to act morally 
who may experience an increase or a decrease in utility, as the case may be; it is also 
other parties, including onlookers, who know about the event, who may experience an 
increase or a decrease in well-being. For example, if we learn that a person has 
committed a wrong but has been properly punished, we may feel good about that; and if 
we learn that he has not been punished at all, or has been punished too severely given the 
gravity of his act, we may feel worse for that reason.  
It is also true that onlookers will sometimes derive utility from taking certain 
actions in the light of behavior that obeys moral notions -- onlookers may praise and 
otherwise reward good behavior, and obtain utility from so doing (otherwise they 
wouldn’t do it) -- and in the light of actions that violate moral notions -- onlookers may 
disapprove and otherwise punish bad behavior.
11  
To summarize, then, I am defining a (nondistributional) notion of morality to be a 
principle for the evaluation of situations that (a) does not depend exclusively on the 
utilities of individuals, and that (b) is associated with the distinctive psychological 
attributes leading, as described above, to virtue and guilt, praise and disapproval.
12 
2.3 Tastes for notions of morality and individual utility. It is apparent from 
what was said in the foregoing section that individuals possess, in connection with a 
notion of morality, a set of tastes that affect their utility. A person will feel happier, his 
utility will be higher, if he feels virtue because he kept a promise, or if he learns that 
punishment of a wrongdoer was correct; and a person will feel worse if he experiences 
guilt because he broke a promise, or if he learns that punishment of a wrongdoer was 
harsh. That such sources of utility and disutility are different in their character from 
conventional springs of utility and disutility (such as satisfying one’s hunger and skinning 
one’s knee) is of no moment from the perspective of welfare economics. I will address 
later the implications of the point that individuals’ utility is affected by the satisfaction or 
failure to satisfy moral notions; here my object is just to make that observation.
13 
2.4 Comment: the existence of tastes for satisfying notions of morality is 
different from their possible deontological significance. When philosophers discuss 
moral notions and urge that they be adhered to, they do not generally give as the reason 
that individuals will be made happy by so doing. Philosophers do not say that individuals 
should be punished in proportion to the badness of their acts because this will make 
                                                 
      
11The connection between morality and feelings of virtue and guilt, the moral sentiments, has been 
developed over the years by, among others, Hutcheson [1725-1755] 1994, Hume [1751] 1998, Smith [1790] 
1976, Mill [1861] 1998, and Sidgwick [1907] 1981. 
12It should be remarked that purely distributional notions of fairness and morality (such as act so 
as to ensure that the utilities of individuals are equal) are also often associated with guilt and virtue, praise 
and disapproval.  
 
      
13This point was, to my knowledge, first made by Mill [1861] 1998, 82-84.  
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victims and onlookers happy in a direct sense. They recommend moral actions on other 
bases, which may be broadly described as deontological. Indeed, they often are explicit in 
saying that the justification for a conception of morality is not dependent upon the tastes, 
the sources of happiness, of individuals in the population; but instead they insist that the 
justification for the notion derives from independent factors. Otherwise, the answer to the 
question whether an action is recommended as right by philosophers would depend on 
the contingency of what the inclinations, the preferences, of the population happen to 
be.
14  Similarly, when individuals themselves (as opposed to philosophers) explain why a 
moral notion should be respected, they usually will not say that it is only because that 
will make them happy; rather, part of their rationale ordinarily is that obeying the notion 
is correct per se. 
    2.5 Analysis is descriptive. The reader should bear in mind that what I have said 
to this point is entirely descriptive; it is what a social scientist would report about notions 
of morality. I have not stated what role moral notions ought to have in the evaluation of 
social situations, and in particular in the choice of legal policy. Rather, I have attempted 
to describe a certain class of evaluative principles, the moral ones, and have pointed out 
that they are associated with a particular set of tastes (those producing feelings of virtue, 
guilt, and so forth).  
 
3. Functionality of Notions of Morality 
3.1 Notions of morality tend to advance our well-being. It has been long 
observed, and has been articulated in considerable detail, that the satisfaction of our 
broadly-held notions of morality tends to advance our well-being. The keeping of 
promises allows people to plan and leads to cooperative ventures that raise our well-
being; punishment according to the gravity of acts deters bad behavior in an effective 
way and thus raises our well-being; and so forth.
15 
3.2 Comment: fostering our well-being is different from the deontological 
significance of notions of morality. That obeying notions of morality fosters our well-
being is not the justification for such notions, according to deontologists. They may 
admit, and think it good, that obeying promises promotes our welfare, but that is not the 
warrant for obeying promises in their eyes; they would want promises obeyed even if that 
did not advance our well-being.
16 
3.3 One reason why obeying moral notions tends to advance our well-being: 
socially undesirable self-interest is curbed. One general reason why obeying moral 
notions promotes our well-being is that this means that individuals will not behave in 
self-interested, opportunistic ways when doing so would be socially undesirable. If I 
adhere to the principle of keeping promises, then I will not break my promise whenever 
that becomes advantageous to me, whereas if I were to break promises for any personal 
gain, the value of promises would be diluted and the social benefits associated with 
promises would diminish. If I follow the principle of punishing in proportion to the 
gravity of the bad act, I will be less likely to shy away from punishing a person because 
of fear of retaliation or because of squeamishness, nor will I allow anger to result in 
                                                 
14See, for example, Kant [1785] 1997, 21-22. 
         
15See especially Hume [1751] 1998 and Sidgwick [1907] 1981, and see also Mill [1861] 1998. 
         
16See, for example, Kant [1785] 1997 and Ross 1930.  
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excessive punishment; were I to act otherwise, the purposes of deterrence might not be 
well served. 
3.4 Another reason why obeying moral notions tends to advance our well 
being: myopic decisions are prevented. A second way in which following moral 
notions may advance our well-being is by serving as guides for behavior in situations 
where it may be difficult to perceive what would maximize our own utility. For example, 
breaking a promise may be tempting, but keeping promises tends to be in our self-interest 
in the long run, because doing so means that those with whom we interact now and in the 
future will come to trust us, and that this trust will benefit us in manifold ways (promises 
will be made and kept with us, we will be honored and admired, and so forth). Or, it may 
be that punishing in proportion to the badness of an act will serve our self-interest 
because we will be dealing with the punished person repeatedly in the future (suppose the 
punished person is our child). By following a set of relatively simple moral principles, 
individuals may, to a degree, promote their self-interest without having to think carefully 
about how they should act to do that.  
3.5 Why we tend to obey moral notions: internal and external incentives 
associated with the psychological attributes of moral notions. For individuals to obey 
moral notions, they must want to do so.
17  Otherwise, they would follow their self-
interest, or their apparent, myopic, self-interest.  
There are two fundamental reasons why individuals will often desire to obey 
moral notions, connected with their associated psychological attributes described in 
section 2.2. One is that individuals have internal incentives to do so, namely, they will 
feel virtuous if they adhere to them, and experience guilt if they do not. Second, 
individuals have external incentives to obey moral notions in that they will be praised by 
others for that behavior and admonished, scolded, or otherwise punished for immoral 
behavior.  
3.6 Moral notions themselves must also be of particular nature to be 
functional; in strict logic they could be perverse. The above argument that our well-
being is advanced by our adhering to moral notions depends, of course, on the 
assumption that the particular moral notions to which we subscribe are beneficial ones. If, 
for instance, there was a moral notion that we should break promises rather than keep 
them, then adhering to this moral notion would lower our welfare. In that case, if we 
curbed our self-interest when self-interest would lead us to keep promises, and instead 
broke promises in order to adhere to the moral notion, the moral notion would tend to 
reduce our well-being. The question arises, therefore, why, if the class of moral notions 
that exists tends to advance our well-being, that it is this class, and not a perverse set of 
moral notions, that we observe. A suggested answer to that question is given below. 
 
4. Origins of Notions of Morality 
4.1 Inculcation. It appears that many notions of what is right are taught to us, 
especially as children, by our parents, teachers, religious figures, and other authoritative 
individuals, as well as by our peers (notably, in play, when we are children). To a degree, 
the teaching occurs through example, sometimes it occurs through pronouncement and 
command, and sometimes it occurs through a species of reasoning referring to the 
functionality of moral rules. Regarding the latter, it might, for instance, be said to a child 
                                                 
17This basic point was early stressed by Hume [1751] 1998.   
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in explaining that promises should be kept: “Think of where the world would be if no one 
kept his promises.” The process of teaching, and of reinforcing, notions of morality 
continues beyond childhood as well. The claim that moral notions are to an important 
degree taught is clear, not only because we know from common experience that teaching 
does occur, but also from the manifest fact that there is, within a society, substantial 
homogeneity of moral notions, and that there is among different societies, significant 
heterogeneity in moral beliefs (compare the norms of the orthodox Muslims of Saudi 
Arabia to those of present-day Americans, or those of either to the norms of the Aztecs). 
It is hard to explain why moral notions within a given society are similar, and why those 
among different societies may display real variation, if moral notions are not to an 
important extent learned and instilled. 
4.2 Evolutionary advantage. Some notions of what is correct may have an 
evolutionary basis, at least in part.
18 A possible example is the principle that punishment 
should be imposed, and in proportion to the seriousness of the transgression, for this 
principle has an evolutionary advantage. In particular, if a person is harmed, say if food is 
taken from him, this will reduce his chances of survival. Thus, a behavior that reduces the 
incidence of harm like theft of food will be favored in an evolutionary sense; the genes 
leading to behavior that prevents theft of food will tend to predominate in the population 
over the course of time. But the pattern of behavior of punishing, of retaliating, when 
harm has been done is often against the narrow, momentary self-interest of a person, 
because after harm is done, it may be too late to undo it, and retaliation may also absorb 
effort and subject the retaliating person to risk. Thus, a person is likely to retaliate and 
punish only if he has a desire to punish per se. Therefore, we would expect the desire to 
punish those who have caused harm to be selected as a trait in an evolutionary sense. 
Further arguments along these lines can be offered for why the desire to punish should be 
calibrated to the level of harm done. Evidence for the claim that this desire has an 
evolutionary basis in man is not only theoretical; behavior that suggests that animals are 
motivated to retaliate in proportion to harm done has been widely observed.
19   
Other moral notions that arguably have an evolutionary basis include altruism 
(certainly for family members; broader forms of altruism may also have an evolutionary 
basis, or may be a sublimated form of that for relatives).
20 
Of course, only a subset of our moral notions can have an evolutionary basis, or 
they can only have a rough basis, for otherwise they could not be malleable, as they are, 
and could not be learned. 
However, it may well be that our generalized capacity to learn and to obey moral 
notions has an evolutionary basis. People who are capable of learning and, of desiring to 
adhere to, a set of moral beliefs are likely to survive better than those who are not. In the 
mists of time, such individuals could have learned a set of behaviors that would, given 
                                                 
18On the general theme of this section, see Darwin [1874] 1998, chapters 4, 5, and, for example, 
Frank 1988, Hirshleifer 1977, Wilson 1980.  
19On the biological origins of retribution, see for example, Daly and Wilson 1988, 
chapters 10, 11, and Trivers 1971, 49; on the retributive urge in animals, see, for 
example, Waal 1980, 205-207. 
20On altruism, seeTrivers 1971 and Wilson 1980.   
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their circumstances, lead them to survive better, cooperate in ways that were good in their 
environment, and the like. Thus, a certain blank-slate character of the capacity to learn 
moral notions must be valuable, as it allows the notions to develop in a way that is 
beneficial for persons in a given environment. This capacity to learn a somewhat flexible 
set of moral notions, in combination with the inherited, genetic predisposition to want to 
adhere to the learned notions (to feel virtuous if they are obeyed, to feel guilty if not), 
whatever they are, is highly functional and should have been favored in an evolutionary 
sense. (If so, then the fact that we appear to have an ability to inculcate moral notions, as 
just described in section 4.1, is explained.) 
4.3 Comments. Several additional remarks about notions of morality are worth 
making. 
(a) Simple character of moral notions. From what has been said, it seems to 
follow that moral notions must be the way that they are observed to be, namely, relatively 
simple in character. In particular, for moral notions to be taught, especially to children at 
an early age, they have to be fairly basic in nature. If moral notions were too nuanced, 
they could not be readily absorbed by children nor by the mass of individuals whose 
ability to ratiocinate is not high. In addition, if we consider the ways in which moral 
notions function to raise our welfare, it is apparent that the notions cannot be too 
complicated. In general, to be practically useful, moral notions have to be capable of 
being applied quickly, without great deliberation, for many decisions in which they are 
needed have to be made rapidly. In addition, to serve to curb opportunism, it is 
advantageous for moral notions to be of a relatively unqualified nature, for otherwise they 
would be vulnerable to manipulation by individuals who could find reasoning supporting 
their self-interest. For example, if the moral notion about promise-keeping includes the 
qualification that promises can be broken for a substantial range of excuses, a person 
would be able, and perhaps likely, to fashion excuses to validate breaking his promise 
when that would not be socially desirable.
21  
(b) Imperfect functional nature of moral notions. The simplicity of moral notions 
implies that they will only imperfectly serve to advance social welfare. Because they are 
simple, they will inevitably fail to induce socially desirable behavior in some 
circumstances.
22 For example, in some situations, it will be desirable for a promise to be 
broken, because the cost of satisfying it exceeds the benefit it brings about (as I explained 
at length in chapters 13 and 15), yet this will not agree with the moral notion because the 
moral notion, being simple, requires that the promise be kept. Another reason, apart from 
simplicity, that moral notions will not perfectly advance social welfare (whatever that 
measure may be) is that the notions are learned. This implies that they will have a certain 
inertia about them, possibly lasting generations, even though they may lose their 
functionality as circumstances change. Likewise, to the extent that moral notions are 
inherited due to the evolutionary pressures of the eons, reflecting factors that may no 
longer exist, they may not be functional, or not perfectly so. The desire to retaliate when 
we have been wronged may be an example in point, for although there are still benefits 
                                                 
21The general view that moral notions must be of a fairly simple character is developed by Austin 
[1832] 1995, lecture 2, and is emphasized, among others, by Sidgwick [1907] 1981 and Hare 1981.  
     
22This point is stressed by the authors cited in the previous note, and by Baron 1993, 1994, among 
many others.   
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associated with this desire, it may be too strong for our purposes, so that if we could mold 
it, we would reduce its power.  
 
5. Welfare Economics and Notions of Morality 
5.1 In general. In this section, I want to sketch the relationship between welfare 
economics and notions of morality in the light of what has been said above. The main 
points are, first, that because of the functionality of notions of morality, they should be 
inculcated and fostered -- this raises social welfare overall.
23 Second, because individuals 
have a taste for the satisfaction of the notions of morality (whether inculcated or 
inherited), there is a direct sense in which the notions have importance in the social 
welfare calculus; their satisfaction matters apart from the benefits they bring us through 
effects on our behavior. But third, the notions should not be given importance in social 
welfare evaluation beyond that associated with their functionality and with our taste for 
their satisfaction -- no deontological importance should be accorded them -- for doing so 
would conflict with social welfare and lead to its reduction. 
5.2 Functionality of notions of morality implies that society should invest in 
their inculcation. The arguments given in sections 2 and 3 explaining how notions of 
morality advance social welfare imply that it is worthwhile for social resources to be 
devoted to instill and reinforce these notions. Social resources are in fact directed toward 
teaching moral notions through the efforts of parents and other authority figures, religious 
institutions, and the like, as described in section 4.1, and possibly through the law as well, 
as will be discussed in the next chapter. Altogether, the investment of social resources in 
inculcation of morality is substantial, and may well be justified by the social benefits 
thereby derived; indeed, greater investment may be warranted. In any case, the point of 
emphasis here is that, from the perspective of welfare economics, investment in fostering 
the learning of notions of morality is investment in a valuable form of social capital. 
5.3 Notions of morality as tastes affects social welfare. Given that individuals 
attach importance to notions of morality as tastes, the notions of morality exert a direct 
effect on social welfare. For example, if I keep a promise and feel virtuous as a result, 
this feeling, which augments my utility, thereby raises social welfare. Other things being 
equal, that in turn means that to maximize social welfare, promises should be kept 
somewhat more often than would be optimal if the measure of social welfare did not 
reflect this utility that individuals experience from keeping promises. In other words, 
satisfying notions of morality is itself a component of social welfare, even though it 
happens to be the case, under the view advanced here, that the reason for the existence of 
these notions is also to advance social welfare. To put the point differently, the notions of 
morality have, and must have, importance to individuals in order to induce them to act 
against their narrow self-interest to advance social welfare. But once this is true, it 
happens, as a kind of byproduct of their ultimate purpose, that the notions affect social 
welfare themselves, in their own right.
24  (I will sometimes use the term conventional 
social welfare to refer to the measure of social welfare in which tastes for morality do not 
enter, and will use the term morally-inclusive social welfare to refer to the measure of 
social welfare in which the tastes are reflected.) 
                                                 
23 Kaplow and Shavell 2002b investigates the optimal inculcation of moral notions, and the 
optimal use of guilt and virtue to enforce the notions, in a formal model of social welfare maximization. 
     
24As noted above, essentially this view was advanced by Mill [1861] 1998, 82-84 .   
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5.4 Ascribing independent importance to notions of morality reduces social 
welfare. The point that satisfying notions of morality influences social welfare by 
affecting individuals’ utilities should be sharply distinguished from the assumption that 
the notions have independent importance, regardless of the degree to which they raise the 
utility of individuals. The view that a moral notion, such as the duty of promise-keeping, 
matters in itself to the evaluation of social welfare is (see section 2.4) the deontological 
view that is shared, at least in part, by virtually all philosophers. Such views conflict with 
a fundamental assumption of welfare economics, which is that social welfare depends 
exclusively on the utilities of individuals.   
If a notion of morality is given independent significance in the evaluation of 
social welfare, it is clear to the intuition that a utility-based measure of social welfare will 
tend to be reduced, for that measure will be compromised to some extent in order to 
adhere to the notion of morality. For example, if promise-keeping is granted independent 
significance, more promises will be kept than would be best if the goal were to keep 
promises only to advance individuals’ utilities, and whatever utility-based measure of 
social welfare one endorses will likely be lower than it could be. 
5.5 Pareto Conflict Theorem. The point just discussed, that according weight to 
a notion of morality per se tends to lower social welfare, is reflected in the following 
conclusion: If independent weight is given to a notion of morality under a measure of 
social welfare, then in some situations the utility of every single individual will be 
lowered as a result of advancing that measure of social welfare.
25  That this claim should 
be true is not surprising, for if the notion of morality has independent weight, this weight 
will exceed the importance of individuals’ utilities between two possible social states if 
the utility differences between the two social states are sufficiently small. Suppose, for 
instance, that independent weight is given to promise-keeping, and that all individuals 
very slightly prefer that promisors be able to break promises when a certain type of 
difficulty arises.
26 Now if the preference of each individual for being able to break 
promises when this difficulty arises is small enough, the fact that promise-keeping has 
independent weight implies that social welfare will be promoted by insisting on promise-
keeping when the difficulty arises. Thus, all individuals will be made worse off -- their 
utilities will be reduced -- as a result of the independent weight placed on promise-
keeping. Such situations in which all individuals are made worse off can be shown 
definitely to arise; whatever is the notion of morality, and whatever is the strength and 
                                                 
     
25The conclusion can be more precisely expressed. Let W  be a social welfare function that is not 
individualistic. Then the assertion is that it is possible to find two social situations x and y such that Ui(x) > Ui(y) 
for each individual i (that is, x is Pareto preferred to y), yet W(y) > W(x). The proof of this requires only very 
weak assumptions, essentially that there is some good, such as a consumption good, that all individuals like to 
possess and that W is continuous in the amounts that individuals have of this good (a much weaker assumption 
than that W is continuous in many, or all, components of social situations). The conclusion is informally 
discussed in Kaplow and Shavell 1999 and formally demonstrated in Kaplow and Shavell 2001a.  
     
26The reason that all individuals -- promisors and promisees -- might prefer that promisors be able to break 
promises if a difficulty arises is that this may raise the value of contracts to both parties. As explained in chapter 
15, if the cost of performance in the difficulty exceeds the value of performance, allowing nonperformance will 
raise the value of the contract to the promisor and to the promisee; the latter will gain because the promisor will 
be willing to lower the price by more than the decline in value to the promisee due to the increased likelihood of 
nonperformance.  
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character of its independent significance, there will always exist situations in which 
maximizing the measure of social welfare reflecting this notion will reduce the utility of 
all individuals. Let me call this conclusion the Pareto conflict theorem, as it states that 
giving weight to a notion of morality leads to conflict with the Pareto principle -- that if 
all individuals prefer one situation to a second, the first should be socially preferred to the 
second. 
Several comments should be made about the Pareto conflict result. First, the result 
implies that any person who endorses the principle that a measure of social welfare 
should rise whenever the utilities of all individuals rise -- the Pareto principle -- must 
abandon any view that ascribes independent importance to a notion of morality, which is 
to say, any deontological view. This is forced upon the person by the requirements of 
logical consistency. If a theory about the social good conflicts with a principle that one 
endorses in any situation, the theory must be rejected for that reason. 
Second, a response that I have sometimes encountered to the Pareto conflict result 
is that, in actual fact, one social choice will rarely, if ever, be preferred by all individuals 
to another, so that, it is said, what would be true were there unanimity of preference can 
be ignored. This response suffers from a non-sequitur. The premise that, in reality, one 
social choice will rarely, or never, be preferred by all to another may well hold. But it 
does not follow from this premise that what would be true in that situation is irrelevant. 
For if what would happen under a deontological principle would contradict unanimous 
preferences in a hypothetical situation, such a principle must be abandoned provided that 
we endorse the Pareto principle (the point just made in the previous paragraph). A 
hypothetical situation that never arises can be quite relevant, because it can reveal a 
property of a view that leads us to abandon the view; that the situation never really arises 
hardly means that we cannot draw implications from what would occur in that situation. 
If we know that a theory of addition implies that, were we on the planet Pluto, two plus 
two would equal five, we must abandon that theory even if we know we will never be on 
Pluto. 
 
Note on the literature. The views presented in this chapter are synthetic, and are 
based, as indicated in the notes, on sometimes long scholarly traditions. The general 
conception that moral notions are associated with feelings of virtue, a form of utility, if 
one obeys them, and are associated with guilt and other emotions creating disutility if one 
disobeys them, is developed especially by Hume ([1751] 1998), Mill ([1861] 1998), 
Sidgwick ([1907] 1981), and Smith ([1790] 1976). The fundamental idea that moral 
notions serve functional purposes is also advanced by these authors, among many others. 
The observation that moral notions are to a degree inculcated is discussed, for example, 
by Austin ([1832] 1995) and Mill, and by Hare (1981); and the point that the notions are 
in some ways produced by evolutionary forces is stressed by Darwin ([1874] 1998) and 
in much modern day sociobiological literature, for instance, by Trivers (1971) and 
Wilson (1980). The point that, although moral notions advance social welfare, they do so 
only imperfectly, due in part to their relative simplicity, is emphasized by Austin and 
Sidgwick, and see also Baron (1993) and Hare. Regarding the implications of the moral 
notions for social welfare, the point that it is socially worthwhile to invest in fostering 
them is consistent with the view of all who see functionality in the notions. The point that 
moral notions do enjoy importance because individuals derive utility from their  
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satisfaction, and thus for that reason constitute a part of the social welfare calculus, is 
made by Mill. The conflict between utility-based social welfare and deontological views 
of morality has in a general sense been the stuff of debates about utilitarianism and 
related issues in philosophy; the point that all deontological views necessarily conflict 
with the Pareto principle, and thus are in deep tension with individual well-being, is 
demonstrated in Kaplow and Shavell (2001a).  




  IMPLICATIONS  FOR THE ANALYSIS OF LAW  
 
Having discussed welfare economics and morality in general, let me now examine some 
of their implications for the legal system. In particular, I here consider the observed 
relationship between law and morality; the optimal domain and design of the law, taking 
morality as a regulator of conduct into account; and the nature of normative discourse 
concerning law and morality. 
 
1. Observed Relationship between Law and Morality 
1.1 Rough congruence exists. Most legal systems appear to reflect, in a broad 
and approximate manner, the moral notions of the societies in which the legal systems 
apply. In our own country, we see that many acts that the law penalizes are considered 
wrong, violative of shared ideas of what is moral. Consider murder, rape, robbery, and 
most crimes; much negligent, tortious behavior; opportunistic breaches of contract; or the 
creation of nuisances.  
Moreover, not only do the acts about which the law is concerned often seem to be 
wrongful, the legal sanctions that are imposed in response appear to be in rough accord 
with basic moral remedial principles. In the area of civil law, the general character of the 
legal remedy is that the wrongdoer pays the victim for harm sustained; notably, tort 
damages are supposed to indemnify victims for losses and contract damages to make the 
victim of a breach whole.This central tendency of the civil law is interpretable as that of 
classical corrective justice, that wrongdoers compensate their victims for harm suffered. 
In the area of criminal law, penalties rise in some fashion with the gravity of the bad act; 
roughing someone up in a brawl is penalized less than stalking him and beating him 
severely, and this less so than his murder. That is to say, criminal punishment tends to 
bear a proportion to the degree of wrongdoing, which is the underlying principle of 
retributive justice. 
Additional evidence for the claim that the law reflects morality is that legal 
systems vary over time and among countries in a way that comports with differences in 
notions of morality. For example, laws concerning the permissibility of types of sexual 
relations (out of marriage, homosexual) have changed in character over the years in our 
country, and are much unlike those of conservative Islamic countries, such as Saudi 
Arabia.  
1.2 But substantial differences between law and morality are apparent. 
Notwith-standing what has just been said, there are important respects in which legal 
systems do not reflect the notions of morality that a society holds. First, many acts 
considered to be wrong are not sanctioned by the law. Lying is generally considered 
immoral, yet it often is not legally punishable (a vast range of false statements that are 
made in social settings, at the workplace, and in commerce are not actionable). Changing 
one=s plans for modest personal advantage, but to the greater detriment of others, is also 
often considered wrong but does not give rise to legal sanctions (suppose that I say that I 
will teach a much needed course, but then bow out because I would slightly prefer to do 
something else). Also, acting in a grossly negligent way (such as leaving a live wire  
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exposed where children are playing) is wrong, but will probably not result in a legal 
action unless somebody actually comes to harm. It is evident, therefore, that there is a 
substantial domain of behavior that is wrong but is not addressed by our formal legal 
system.  
Second, many acts that are penalized under the law are not considered wrong, or 
only in a very attenuated way. Where liability is strict, parties face sanctions even if they 
take all reasonable precautions and thus even if their behavior is not wrongful.
27  Another 
general example is provided by legal rules that most would describe as technical in 
character, especially those concerned with finance and business -- consider the 
requirements for registration of securities with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
and fine points of the doctrines governing the permissibility of mergers under the 
antitrust laws. These rules cannot easily be linked to our notions of morality. It is 
possible, though, that because individuals understand such technical rules to have been 
designed to promote the common good in some way, however indirect and ramified 
(registration of securities promotes trade in securities, which allows firms to raise capital 
and individuals to invest, which leads to more economic activity and ultimately to greater 
welfare), there does exist a refined sense in which individuals feel a duty to obey the 
technical rules. Nevertheless, I believe the reader will agree that these technical areas of 
the law do not have a clear moral basis.
28 
Third, the magnitude and character of legal sanctions sometimes departs 
significantly from what our moral sense would require. Tort damages are often different 
from what would seem to be an actor=s just deserts. A firm that knowingly acts 
negligently and in such a way as is likely to cause great harm (including many deaths) but 
that turns out to cause only modest harm may be required to pay just for that harm, 
whereas we might well believe that the firm deserves to be punished severely and that 
responsible individuals within it should bear strong penalties. A party who decides to 
break a contract because a more advantageous opportunity has arisen may only have to 
pay modest damages, whereas the moral duty to keep promises might seem to call for 
more serious legal sanctions. Fines and other criminal penalties also often deviate from 
retributive principles of proportionality. For example, fines for parking violations may be 
many multiples of harm done (consider a $25 fine for parking too long at a metered 
space), whereas the punishment for murder may be less than the harm done (a few years 
in jail arguably translates into less than the loss of a life). 
1.3 Explanation of the foregoing. The descriptions of the preceding sections 
make basic sense from the point of view of economic analysis and what has been said in 
chapter 26 about notions of morality. 
                                                 
     
27Sometimes, however, it is asserted that our sense of morality would lead to liability for harms arising from 
engaging in the activities for which strict liability applies (such as transporting wastes across a lake). If this be so, 
then I would say that the sense of the moral obligation is a weak one, but the reader can judge that issue for 
himself. 
     
28It is no answer to say that individuals feel a moral obligation to obey all our laws, whether technical or not. 
This may be true (in which case, note, any rule whatever would be considered to have a moral basis). The 
question under consideration here is whether legal rules have an independent moral basis -- a basis such that, 
were they not part of our legal system, there would be a moral reason to adhere to them (virtue would be felt if 
they were obeyed, guilt if not; see section 2 of chapter 26).   
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Specifically, we would expect to observe substantial, if rough, congruence 
between law and morality for two reasons. The first is simply that individuals want moral 
notions to be obeyed; as discussed in section 2 of the last chapter, individuals attach 
importance to the moral notions themselves and desire that they be satisfied. Because the 
law is designed by individuals, it is not surprising that the law should be influenced by 
the value that individuals place on adherence to the moral notions. Thus, for instance, 
because we believe that promise-keeping is desirable, we wish contract law to promote 
the keeping of contracts, and because we desire punishment to be in proportion to the 
seriousness of bad acts, we want criminal sanctions to be fashioned in that way.  
The second reason that an observer would expect there to be a degree of 
resemblance between morality and law is different. If morality and law have the same 
underlying objective, to promote social welfare, we would predict that these two systems 
of rules would display similarities. For example, we would expect both morality and our 
legal system to foster the keeping of promises because that promotes social welfare 
through inducing cooperative efforts, trade, and production. In other words, it is not just 
that the law fosters the keeping of contracts because of the moral value people place on 
promise-keeping, rather, the law has also evolved to foster the keeping of contracts 
because of the functional value of so doing, and the moral notion of promise-keeping has 
evolved because of the same functional value. 
We would also expect there to be substantial differences between our system of 
morals and law. The first difference that I mentioned, that there are many immoral acts 
(like lying) that the law does not sanction, is understandable from the economic 
perspective. As will be discussed below (see section 2), it is impractically costly for 
society to attempt to govern a significant domain of undesirable human behavior through 
the legal system, whereas it is relatively inexpensive and generally sufficient to control 
much such behavior through our notions of morality alone. Additionally, some immoral 
behavior is not socially undesirable, so that we would not want to control it through use 
of the legal system; because our notions of morality are, and must be, relatively simple in 
character character (as was discussed above in section 4 of chapter 26), certain acts that 
are socially desirable will be seen as immoral, and it would be unwise policy to make 
them illegal.  
The second difference that I noted was that there are many acts that are punished 
under the law (like improper mergers of businesses) but which are not immoral, or not 
obviously so. The main explanation for this being the case is that there is much behavior 
that is worthwhile controlling in order to raise social welfare, and which the law therefore 
does control. At the same time, some of this behavior is not offensive to our system of 
morality, because, again, our notions of morality are relatively simple in character. This 
point will be amplified in section 2 below.  
Similarly, the third difference that I noted, concerning deviations between legal 
punishment and what seems meet from a moral perspective, can be explained by the fact 
that the law is fairly flexibly designed to promote social welfare, whereas our system of 
morality has a simple character. For a variety of reasons, sanctions that advance our 
welfare will not necessarily be set in proportion to the gravity of bad acts. Notably, the 
social welfare-optimal magnitude of sanctions will reflect the likelihood of their 
imposition and the costs of their imposition (as was spelled out in chapters 20 and 21),  
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but these factors are largely independent of the moral quality of acts. This too will be 
discussed below, in section 3.  
1.4 Effect of law on morality. To this point in my consideration of the 
relationship between law and morality, I have not mentioned the possibility of an effect 
of the law on our notions of morality and its force,
29 but it is probable that this effect 
exists and I mention here two possible ways in which it may come about. 
            First, it is plausible that the law influences the moral beliefs that individuals hold. 
As mentioned in section 4 of chapter 26, our moral views seem to a significant extent to 
be inculcated and learned. Thus, the law might influence our moral beliefs if it plays a 
role in instilling and teaching individuals moral values, and one can see that this may be 
so. For example, a parent or a minister, in trying to impress on a child the lesson that theft 
is wrong or that discrimination based on skin color is wrong, could mention to the child 
that the law holds that theft and discrimination are wrong and result in sanctions. This 
statement about the law could lend authority to the message and make it more likely that 
the child would learn the lessons and ultimately adopt them as moral values. There is also 
a possibility that legal rules would exert a similar effect on adults and help to alter their 
moral beliefs. (But to me this seems a less important factor, given what I perceive to be 
the small degree to which adults change their fundamental moral beliefs.) 
Second, the law can enhance the effectiveness of our moral beliefs by changing 
our willingness to impose social sanctions on those who have violated notions of 
morality; this in turn will enhance deterrence of immoral behavior. Consider the 
inclination of a person who believes that discrimination is wrong to chastise those who 
engage in it and otherwise impose on them sanctions of a social type. It seems plausible 
that such a person would be more likely to impose these social sanctions if there exists a 
law penalizing discrimination. The person might infer from the existence of the law that 
the view that discrimination is wrong is more widely held in the population than he 
otherwise believed, and thus that more individuals would join him in condemning this 
behavior, or would give silent approval, or at least would not resist his condemnation. 
The existence of the law might also reduce the chance of retaliation against the person 
contemplating admonishing the discriminator, for the latter could be threatened with legal 
sanctions. In other words, the rational calculus of a person who holds moral beliefs 
against a type of behavior, and who contemplates imposing social sanctions on those who 
engage in the bad behavior, changes in favor of so doing when there is a law against the 
behavior. In this way, without altering intrinsic moral beliefs, the law can influence their 
effectiveness because the law increases the likelihood of social sanctions for immoral 
behavior. 
 
2. Optimal Domain of Law and of Morality 
I now consider the question of the optimal domain of morality and of the legal system.
30  
That is, what is the set of behaviors that it is socially advantageous to control solely 
through use of our notions of morality, what is the set of behaviors that it is best to 
                                                 
     
29What has been noted so far is the influence of morality on law -- in that we design the law to reflect our 
moral tastes -- and an influence on both law and morality of the underlying goal of advancing social welfare.  
30This section is based largely on Shavell 2002. 
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control jointly through morality and law, and what is the set that it is desirable to control 
through law alone?  In examining these issues, I will assume that our notions of morality 
are as described generally in section 2 of chapter 26, and that the social goal is to employ 
morality and law so as to maximize social welfare, taking into account the costs and 
effectiveness of morality and of law as social regulators of conduct.
31 
2.1 General comparison of law and morality as regulators of conduct. As I 
discussed in section 3 of chapter 26, notions of morality can serve to govern behavior so 
as to further social welfare by means of internal incentives -- the reward of the feeling of 
virtue, the penalty of guilt – and also by means of external incentives -- the reward of 
praise, the penalty of chastisement. The legal system of course governs behavior through 
use of external incentives, principally monetary sanctions and imprisonment. Let me now 
compare morality and law as methods of social control of behavior. After doing so, I will 
make use of the comparison in an examination of the optimal domains of law and 
morality. 
Establishment of rules. The establishment of legal rules ordinarily is not a very 
expensive process, requiring only that a law be passed by a legislative body or that a 
judge make a decision that helps to articulate a rule, and that the rule be properly 
communicated.  However, the establishment of moral rules is evidently very expensive 
from a social perspective, assuming that this occurs through socialization and inculcation. 
To instill the moral rules that one should not litter, or lie, or cheat, and the like, requires 
constant effort over the years of childhood (and reinforcement thereafter). If we regard 
the duties of parents, schools, and religious institutions as comprised importantly of the 
teaching of children in the moral dimension, then we can appreciate that society’s 
investment in imbuing moral rules is substantial. Yet one should also note that where 
moral notions are inborn, or virtually so, establishment of the notions is essentially free 
from a social perspective.  
Specificity and flexibility of rules; degree to which rules reflect socially desirable 
conduct. Legal rules can be as specific as we please because they are consciously and 
deliberately fashioned by us. Hence, legal rules can in principle be tailored to promote 
socially desirable conduct and to discourage undesirable conduct at a highly detailed 
level. Legal rules are also flexible in the sense that they can be changed essentially at 
will, as circumstances  require. Hence, if what is socially desirable or undesirable 
changes, so can legal rules change. 
By contrast, it seems that moral rules cannot be highly detailed and finely 
nuanced in character. As discussed in section 4.3 of Chapter 26, these rules need to be 
inculcated in children, be easy to apply in everyday life, and not be vulnerable to self-
interested manipulation. Also, to the degree that moral rules have an evolutionary basis, 
they will often tend to be simple in character, because very specific rules are generally 
not ones that have functional value over the long periods of time during which the forces 
                                                 
31To amplify, in this section the object is to maximize social welfare where, for convenience, I focus on 
the effectiveness and the costs of the law and of morality, without taking into explicit account that our notions of 
morality themselves enter into individual utility and thus into social welfare. This simplification will not affect 
the qualitative nature of the conclusions reached. For example, were I to take into account how adherence to 
moral notions itself raises utility and thus is a source of welfare, the conclusion that it is socially desirable 
sometimes to regulate conduct solely through moral notions, because they are cheapest, would not change (only 
the boundaries of the domain of behavior over which the sole use of morality would be optimal would change).   
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of natural selection operate. Additionally, moral rules are not very flexible. Rules that are 
inculcated are not subject to alteration in the short run, and when the moral rules have a 
biological basis, they obviously cannot be changed. 
The implication of the lack of specificity and flexibility of moral rules relative to 
legal rules is that moral rules will more often lead to errors in conduct than legal rules. 
For instance, a person may decide to honor a contract due to the moral obligation to keep 
the promise it represents, even though breaching the contract would be socially preferable 
under the circumstances (perhaps the expense of performance greatly outweighs its value 
to the promisee) and the law would allow breach. Or a person might refrain from 
reporting the bad behavior of a friend out of a moral duty of  fidelity, even though it 
would be socially desirable for the friend to be reported (perhaps his bad behavior would 
otherwise continue), and the law might allow or require reporting. 
Magnitude of sanctions. Legal rules can be enforced by monetary sanctions and 
by imprisonment, with no limit in principle save for the wealth of an individual and his 
remaining lifetime. As such, the potential magnitude of legal sanctions is great.  
What is the magnitude of the moral sanctions?  I will assume here that the moral 
sanctions are, over most of their range and for most individuals, weaker, and perhaps 
much weaker, than high legal sanctions. This is based on the judgment that, at least for 
the great mass of individuals in modern industrialized nations, the disutility due to losing 
one’s entire wealth or going to jail for life outweighs, and probably by a significant 
amount, the sting of guilt and of disapproval (or rather, that plus the utility from virtue 
and praise).
32  This is not to deny that for some individuals, the moral sanctions might 
have greater weight than the legal (a person might fear burning in Hell forever, or find 
the disapproval of the public to be almost intolerable), nor is it to deny the possibility that 
in some future world, moral socialization could be such that doing the right thing 
mattered much more than it now does. But in the type of society in which we find 
ourselves, where internal moral sanctions appear limited and external ones are diluted by, 
among other things, the ability of individuals to move, away from those who might 
reproach them, the assumption that moral sanctions are weaker seems to be the correct 
one. Another point that should be made is that moral sanctions are unable to prevent bad 
conduct through incapacitation of individuals, which is something that is accomplished 
by the legal sanction of imprisonment. Thus, an important tool for reducing bad conduct 
that is available under the law is absent from the moral arsenal.  
Probability of sanctions. The probability of legal sanctions depends on 
circumstances; the imposition of sanctions for violations is not automatic. For a legal 
sanction to be imposed, the violation of law needs to be observed by someone, and then it 
has to be reported. Even where it is observed by the victim and he can bring suit, such as 
might be the case with a tortious harm and would usually be the case with a breach of 
contract, the victim might not find legal action worthwhile given its cost. Also, for many 
violations for which enforcement is public, the likelihood of sanctions is notoriously low. 
                                                 
32The true incentive to act in a moral way is the difference between one’s position 
when one acts morally and when one does not; it is thus the sum of the utility of the 
reward for acting morally -- the utility from virtue and praise -- and the disutility from 
doing otherwise -- the disutility from guilt and disapprobation.   
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In contrast, the probability of imposition of the internal moral sanctions is one 
hundred percent, as previously noted (self-deception aside). A person who believes that it 
is immoral to cheat on his taxes will definitely feel guilty for so doing, and will definitely 
feel virtuous for paying the proper amount, because he will know whether he honestly 
paid his taxes.  
The probability of imposition of the external moral sanctions, of disapprobation 
and praise, is a different matter, and may or may not be higher than that of imposition of 
legal sanctions, depending on the context. For instance, the likelihood that a person 
would be seen cutting into a line and would suffer the external moral sanction of sour 
looks is presumably high (for others in the line would notice), but the likelihood of being 
found out and of experiencing disapproval for cheating on ones taxes might be lower than 
that of being caught in a tax audit, for tax cheaters are unlikely to be caught by their 
fellow citizens.    
Availability of information for the application of rules.  In the application of legal 
rules, certain information is needed. But information can be difficult to acquire or verify, 
such as that concerning whether a person committed a crime and, if so, what exactly the 
circumstances were. The difficulty associated with substantiation of information has two 
disadvantageous implications. One is that errors may be made, such as when a person is 
found guilty of murder when he really acted in self-defense, or when he is found to have 
acted in self-defense when he in truth did not. The other is that legal rules are sometimes 
designed in a less refined manner than would be desirable if more information were 
available. For example, bartenders might be held strictly liable for serving liquor to 
minors because information about bartenders’ true opportunities to determine the age of 
customers is generally hard to obtain. 
These disadvantages due to difficulties in obtaining information do not apply in 
regard to the enforcement of moral rules with internal sanctions, because a person will 
naturally know what he did and why. If a person kills someone, he will know whether he 
acted in self-defense; if he serves liquor to a customer, he will know whether he 
suspected that the customer was underage. The virtually perfect quality of the 
information that a person has about himself means that the internal moral sanctions will 
not be erroneously applied and that the moral rules need not exclude any potentially 
relevant information.
33 
The conclusion is somewhat different, however, with respect to enforcement of 
moral rules with external sanctions. Here there may be informational difficulties, for the 
observer of conduct may not have all the relevant information or may make errors. 
Nevertheless, these problems are often less serious than those faced by the legal system. 
When a person’s conduct is observed by another person, such as when one person catches 
another in a lie, the observing party who chides or reprimands the wrongdoer does not 
have to establish what he knows to the satisfaction of a tribunal. Additionally, there is a 
                                                 
33The point of this paragraph may be compared to the point made above that 
moral rules may lead to socially worse outcomes than legal rules because of the limited 
complexity of moral rules. Here, the point is that moral rules may lead to socially 
superior outcomes than legal rules do, because of the greater information that may be 
available for the application of the moral rules.   
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peculiar self-correcting mechanism at work in respect to the imposition of external 
sanctions: If a person is mistaken in his criticism of another, the reproval may be dulled 
in its impact, for it seems to be a psychological fact that disapproval will not register as 
much if it is not deserved. 
A further point about external moral sanctions, but working in favor of legal 
sanctions, is that parties who observe the conduct of others may sometimes not possess 
certain relevant information that could be acquired in a legal setting. For instance, if one 
person observes that another breaks a promise to him and is given an excuse as the 
rationale, the victim of the broken promise might not be able to determine whether the 
excuse is the truth. However, in a legal setting, an excuse offered for breaking a contract 
could be investigated; witnesses could be forced to come forward and to testify under 
oath.  
Costs of enforcement. The costs of enforcement of legal rules have to do with the 
expenses of identifying violators and of adjudication, which can be substantial, especially 
when public enforcement agents are involved. By contrast, the costs of enforcement of 
moral rules are non-existent in regard to internal sanctions. In regard to external 
sanctions, costs of enforcement are probably lower on average than those of legal rules, 
even though there might be some adjudication in the form of gossip and discussion of the 
propriety of acts. 
Costs of imposition of sanctions. Legal rules involve sanctioning costs, and these 
depend on whether the sanctions are monetary or are terms of imprisonment. As has been 
discussed in chapters 20 and 21, monetary sanctions are sometimes said to be socially 
free, or at least much less expensive than imprisonment.  
Regarding moral sanctions, consider first guilt. Because guilt does not involve 
administrative expense to effect, it appears to be a socially cheaper form of sanction than 
imprisonment. Disapproval is much like guilt as a sanction, except that the consequences 
of its use for those who express it need to be incorporated into the social calculus, and 
what should be assumed about this matter is not entirely obvious. Virtue and praise 
obviously differ from guilt and disapproval in that they are sanctions that create utility, 
rather than lower it.
34  
The conclusions about the costs of imposing sanctions may be expressed as 
follows: The legal sanction of imprisonment appears to be the most costly to impose, 
monetary sanctions may or may not be more costly to impose than guilt and 
disapprobation depending on administrative expense, and virtue and praise actually 
increase social welfare when employed as incentives.  
                                                 
34For an economically oriented analysis of the moral sanctions of guilt and virtue, 
taking into account that guilt is costly and that virtue creates utility, see Kaplow and 
Shavell 2001b.  
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  Amoral  individuals.  To this point, we have been considering general factors 
bearing on legal versus moral rules, but a particular factor of potential significance bears 
mention. Namely, there may be individuals in the population for whom moral incentives 
are not very important. Indeed, this group may not be small in size, especially in 
societies, like that of the present-day United States, where families and other social 
institutions that provide stable environments for the socialization of children are often 
weak. The existence of a relatively amoral subgroup of the population implies that, for 
them, moral sanctions will fail to prevent much immoral behavior. Members of this 
subgroup will, by assumption, not be affected by the internal moral incentives of virtue 
and guilt, and will probably also not care as much as others about the external incentives 
of disapproval and praise. Moreover, these individuals will be unlikely themselves to 
impose the external moral sanctions called for by the misconduct of others, exacerbating 
the breakdown of the power of moral incentives. The presence of amoral individuals is 
thus a factor that favors legal rules over moral rules. 
Firms (and other organizations). Another special factor worthy of note is that the 
power of moral incentives may be diluted within firms (and other organizations). 
Consider first the internal moral incentives, and let me note initially the familiar point 
that, because a firm is not in fact a person, but rather a collective comprised of different 
individuals, we cannot speak in a literal sense of internal moral incentives in respect to a 
firm. However, individuals within a firm can feel guilt or virtue in regard to their own 
behavior. A reason for thinking that the internal moral incentives may be less effective in 
the setting of the firm than outside that setting is that decisions within firms are often 
made jointly by groups, or influenced by orders from above, or acted upon and influenced 
by subsequent decisions made below; this serves to attenuate the sense of personal 
responsibility for one’s acts. Another factor is that firms often attempt to establish their 
own norms of loyalty (consider the corporate ethos at companies like IBM), which may 
tend to offset the usual moral incentives when the latter come into conflict with the 
objectives of the firm. 
Second, the external moral incentives have unclear force in relation to employees 
of firms. One reason is that, as just remarked, responsibility within a firm is often 
diffused, so that there often will not be specific individuals within firms whom outsiders 
will be able to identify and punish for wrongful behavior. Another reason is that a firm 
may have an incentive to conceal the identity of responsible individuals within it, just so 
they can escape external social sanctions. However, outsiders may impose external 
sanctions on a firm even though they have not identified a responsible individual within 
it. For example, they might refuse to make purchases from a firm that acted in a grossly 
negligent manner. 
Summary. The discussion of this section shows that law and morality each has 
advantages over the other in certain respects, which may be summarized (I omit 
qualifications) as follows. Law may enjoy advantages over morality due to the ease with 
which legal rules can be established, their flexible character, and the plausibly greater 
magnitude of legal sanctions over moral sanctions. Also, the presence of amoral 
individuals is a factor favoring reliance on law, as is the presence of firms, for whom 
moral forces are likely to be relatively weak. However, morality may possess advantages 
over law because moral sanctions are often applied with higher likelihood than legal ones 
(notably, internal moral sanctions apply with certainty), may reflect superior and more  
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accurate information about conduct, and may involve lower costs of enforcement and 
imposition. 
2.2 Domain in which morality alone is optimal. It will be best to control 
behavior solely through use of morality when three conditions hold: first, that morality 
functions reasonably well by itself; second, that morality is not worthwhile 
supplementing with law, given the social benefits that would flow from that and the 
added costs; third, that law alone is not as desirable to employ as morality alone. 
These conditions will tend to apply when two things are true: The expected 
private gain from undesirable conduct is not too great, and the expected harm due to such 
conduct is also not too great. For if the expected private gain from bad conduct is not too 
great, then the moral sanctions, even though not as strong as legal sanctions, will very 
often be sufficient to discourage the conduct. And if the expected harm from bad conduct 
is not too great, then on those occasions when moral sanctions fail to prevent the conduct, 
the social effects will not be so serious, and thus would not warrant the added expense of 
the legal system as a supplement to morality. However, the question remains whether it 
might be more desirable to employ law alone than morality alone. The points just made 
imply that the social value of law over morality will not be great, so that use of morality 
alone will be superior to use of law alone when the added expense of the law exceeds its 
modest marginal social value. 
Let us now examine the domain in which behavior is in fact controlled primarily 
by morality. This area of behavior is, as indicated above, comprised of a great multitude 
of acts that we undertake in everyday life. Consider the keeping of promises about social 
engagements, acting so as to refrain from creating minor nuisances, or lending a helping 
hand when that is not difficult to do. I suggest that this domain of behavior where mainly 
morality applies is broadly consistent with the theory advanced above. In particular, the 
expected private gains from bad conduct are in fact typically small or modest. If a person 
breaks a lunch date, cuts into a line, or fails to keep quiet in a movie theatre, the benefits 
that he obtains are not usually of large magnitude. This being so, the moral sanctions will 
often be enough to deter bad conduct; the automatic functioning of the internal moral 
sanction of guilt, combined with the external sanctions, will frequently be sufficient to 
dissuade individuals from acting incorrectly. Further, when that is not so and individuals 
do engage in bad conduct, the harms they cause appear on average to be minor. Again, if 
a person breaks a lunch date, cuts into a line, or talks in a movie theatre, the social 
detriment will usually not be significant. Hence, the claim is that it would not be socially 
worthwhile to append the legal system to the moral system in order to help prevent this 
residuum of bad acts from occurring. That is, it would not be advantageous to subsidize 
civil suit to bring about legal actions for such harms as broken lunch dates, or to employ 
public enforcement authorities to hand out tickets for cutting in line or talking in movie 
theatres, because the cost of doing so would outweigh the benefit from the not-too-great 
additional harms that would be prevented.  
Moreover, the disadvantage of appending the legal system to the moral one in the 
domain under discussion is not limited to the direct costs of use of the legal system; it is 
also likely that many mistakes would be made under the legal sysem relative to that under 
the moral one. When an individual breaks a lunch date or cuts into a line, he will know 
about this and, as noted above, will not make errors in judging the correctness of his own 
behavior. Also, the assessments of those around him will tend to be reasonably accurate,  
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at least by comparison to those that would be made under the legal system. The legal 
system could not hope to sort out, in the way we do ourselves, broken lunch dates due to 
valid excuses (suppose that a truly good friend appeared unannounced from out of town) 
from those that are not. The mistakes that would inevitably be made under the legal 
system, especially punishment that is not merited, constitute a separate cost that 
reinforces the argument against use of the law in the domain of everyday conduct. 
It remains to consider whether it might be desirable to employ the law alone 
instead of morality alone in the area of behavior in question. In order to assess how law 
alone would function, we must imagine a world in which people are unlike people as we 
know them -- we must envision individuals who are devoid of compunctions about 
breaking promises, lying, and the like, who essentially do not care about each other, who 
are sociopathic. And we must ask in this notional world how well law would control the 
behavior and about the expense of control. A strong surmise is that it would be 
enormously expensive to control the behavior at issue because of its variousness and 
extent, that society might be bankrupted by a serious attempt to do so, and, as mentioned 
in the previous paragraph, that many mistakes would be made. The conclusion is that use 
of law alone would be clearly inferior to use of morality alone in the domain where 
morality is observed to be relied upon. 
2.3 Domain in which morality and law are optimal. It will be best to use law to 
supplement morality where the cost of so doing is justified by the extra social benefit. 
This will tend to be true when two conditions hold: The expected private gains from 
undesirable conduct are often large, and the expected harms due to such conduct are also 
often large. For if the expected gains from bad conduct are great, then the moral sanctions 
may not be enough to prevent it. And if the expected harms from bad conduct are 
substantial, then failure to prevent bad conduct will be socially serious, and thus make 
worthwhile the additional expense of the legal system as a supplement to morality. 
Let us now consider the range of behavior that is regulated both by morality and 
by law. This area covers most acts that are criminal; murder, rape, robbery, fraud, and 
like acts are not only crimes but also are generally said to be immoral. Additionally, 
many torts, including most acts of negligence, many breaches of contract, and many 
violations of regulations are not only legally sanctionable but also are considered not to 
be moral.    
It appears that this domain of behavior is characterized by the condition that the 
private gains from bad conduct are often large. The utility obtained by those who commit 
criminal acts tends to be significant; the murderer, the rapist, and the thief generally have 
strong motivations to act. Also, the private benefits obtained by those who commit many 
torts or breaches of contract are substantial, especially because large amounts of money 
are frequently at stake. Hence, the internal moral sanctions alone will often not be 
enought to prevent the bad conduct. 
Another reason for failure of moral incentives to control conduct in the domain is 
that the external moral incentives are often unlikely to apply, because the bad actor will 
not be noticed or, if noticed, will not be reprimanded. This is obviously so of many 
criminal acts. Similarly, behavior that can give rise to torts often goes unspotted, or at 
least does not result in disapproval. For example, consider improper driving behavior, 
such as speeding or going through a red light. If a driver does these things, he often won’t 
be noticed, and if he is, how is it that other drivers are going to have the opportunity to  
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scold him?  The external sanction of disapprobation is unlikely to be brought to bear in 
many other situations in which accidents might occur, and in which tort law and safety 
regulation are in fact brought to bear. This point should not be overstated, however. 
There are important situations, such as breaches of contract, in which problematic 
conduct will be noticed and there will be ample opportunity for observers to express their 
disapproval of it. 
It also seems true that the condition concerning the harm from bad conduct 
applies in the domain in question. The social consequences of failure to control crimes 
and torts, which often result  in injury and death, as well as breaches of contract and 
many of the other acts to which our legal system applies, are manifestly great (especially 
in comparison to the consequences of broken lunch dates, cutting in line, and other 
quotidian misbehavior). Hence, the benefits from preventing these harms through use of 
the law, when they are not prevented by morality, are significant, and these benefits 
outweigh the costs of employing the legal system. 
Additionally, the problem of amoral individuals is of obvious relevance to the 
issue at hand. Because the magnitude of harm from the undesirable conduct that we are 
considering is great, the existence of amoral subgroups is of special significance. Even if 
small, such subgroups, if unchecked, can wreak great social harm, especially through 
repeated crimes, but also through extremely negligent behavior, failure to obey contracts, 
and other bad acts. 
The presence of firms further supports the thesis that law is needed as a 
supplement to morality in the realm of behavior under discussion. As suggested earlier, 
the force of moral sanctions, both internal and external, is diluted in respect to the 
behavior of firms. Firms, though, are often in a position to do large harm by virtue of 
their size and importance in modern economies; they mediate most production and 
exchange and can cause much physical and economic injury from misconduct. Hence, if 
society attempted to control the behavior of firms only by resort to moral sanctions, 
substantial harm would result. Legal rules, however, do alter the behavior of firms for the 
good, either directly, by fiat, or by threat of monetary sanctions. 
Thus, altogether, my conclusion is that for most of the acts that society has chosen 
to control through the law and through morality, the use of moral incentives alone would 
not function well due to some combination of the following factors: substantial private 
benefits from committing bad acts, inadequacy of internal and external moral sanctions to 
counter the private benefits, the presence of amoral subgroups, and the activity of firms. 
The imperfect performance of our moral system as a regulator of conduct, together with 
very high social costs of failure to control conduct, warrants the use of our costly legal 
system. 
A different reason why law may be socially useful in controlling conduct where 
morality also applies is, in a sense, the opposite of what has been discussed so far in this 
section. Namely, it may happen that a notion of morality is socially counterproductive, 
and legal rules are needed to channel behavior in a different, and socially desirable, 
direction (rather than that legal rules are needed to steer behavior in the direction that 
morality already points).
35  For example, I mentioned the possibility that a person might 
refrain from reporting a friend’s bad conduct because of a feeling of loyalty, even though 
                                                 
35This is a theme of E. Posner 1996.  
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reporting the conduct might be socially desirable, or that a person might not want to 
breach a contract, even though breaching might be socially desirable given the high cost 
of performance. If so, legal intervention, requiring the reporting of the friend or 
permitting breach, might be socially desirable. Although these situations in which law 
may be needed to offset the effect of morality are not typical, neither are they rare, and 
this should not be considered surprising. As stressed above, moral notions cannot be too 
complex for various reasons, and thus we would predict that they would come into 
conflict with socially desirable behavior in some circumstances.  
 Having considered why it is beneficial to supplement morality with law to 
control the behavior under discussion, let me address the question of why would it not 
make sense for society to rely solely on the law to control the behavior -- that is, why it is 
beneficial to supplement law with morality. For example, why should society not rely 
solely on criminal law to combat murder?   A primary answer must be that law will only 
imperfectly deter murder, and given the seriousness of that act, society will find it 
advantageous to employ morality also as an instrument of control.  There will be many 
occasions in which a person would be unlikely to be caught for a murder that would 
advantage him, but if he thinks murder is a moral evil, he might not even contemplate 
that act, much less commit it. As a general matter, legal rules do not always apply, and 
even when they do apply with high likelihood, the sanctions may not be strong enough to 
deter bad behavior. For this reason, and because the harm from the acts in question tends 
to be large, society will find it worthwhile to buttress legal rules with moral ones, 
presuming that the cost of so doing is not too large. (And as I will explain below, the cost 
of these supporting moral rules may be quite low, possibly zero.) 
A second rationale for supplementing law with morality is that legal rules may not 
reflect certain information that is relevant to achieving socially desirable outcomes, 
whereas moral rules can reflect such information. For example, the law might award low 
damages for breach of a contract to photograph an important event, since proving its 
significance to a court might be difficult. However, the photographer might well realize 
from personal observation that the event is important, and thus if he feels it is his moral 
duty to keep promises, he will not breach the contract even though he can do so by law 
and it may be in his self-interest to do so. This is an example of what was discussed in 
part in section 2.1, that the information that is available to apply moral rules may be 
superior to that available to apply legal rules. On reflection, there are many cases in 
which the law does not take into account factors of relevance, due to difficulty of proof, 
but the involved parties know of these factors and, spurred by moral considerations, 
might act in a socially desirable way even though the law would not lead them to do this. 
A third consideration is that moral rules may often be inexpensive supplements to 
legal ones. Let us consider the moral rule against murder as an example. The act of 
murder falls into a general category of conduct -- that of intentionally harming others -- 
that it is socially desirable to treat as wrongful. It is desirable to treat this general 
category of conduct as immoral because the acts in it tend to be socially undesirable and 
because much of the category is not controlled by law: There are innumerable ways in 
which individuals may intentionally harm each other in everyday life that we do not want 
to occur and that the broad moral rule at issue discourages, but which the law does not 
affect. Moreover, a refined moral rule under which murder would not be viewed as 
immoral would probably be unnatural and psychologically jarring, because of the evident  
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underlying similarity between murder and many of the other acts that involve intentional 
harm and that are classified as immoral. Additionally, for the various reasons given 
earlier moral rules cannot be too nuanced and thus could not accommodate such 
distinctions. In sum, then, the argument concerning the moral rule against murder is this: 
Given that society finds it advantageous to have a general moral rule against intentionally 
harming individuals, society enjoys, as a byproduct, the application of the general moral 
rule to murder, as a supplement to criminal law. Similar arguments can be given for many 
other acts that are in the domain controlled by both law and morality; these acts fit under 
the head of some general moral rule that society has good reason to establish. 
2.4 Domain in which law alone is optimal. It will be best to control behavior 
solely through use of law when, among other things, morality does not function well 
alone and law is needed to control behavior. These two conditions will tend to hold when 
the expected private gains from undesirable conduct are large and the expected harms due 
to such conduct are also large. For, as has been discussed above,  if the expected private 
gains from bad conduct are large, then the moral sanctions may not be enough to prevent 
it; and if the expected harms from bad conduct are substantial, then failure to prevent bad 
conduct will be socially serious, and thus will justify use of the legal system. A third 
condition that must hold in order for law alone to be optimal is that law is not worth 
supplementing with moral rules in view of the cost of so doing. 
Before considering the relevance of the foregoing to what is observed, let us ask 
whether there does exist a domain of behavior in which primarily the law applies, in 
which morality is only weakly or not at all relevant. It was suggested earlier that many of 
our technical, often fairly detailed, legal rules have this character, such as a rule requiring 
that a company have at least a stipulated amount of capital to be allowed to sell securities 
on an equity market. Another example is a rule mandating the use of a particular 
accounting convention for valuation of inventories (such as last-in-first-out), or a rule 
proscribing the planting of an apparently innocuous species of tree in an area. What I am 
claiming is that it would not strike a person as intrinsically immoral -- as immoral in the 
absence of a law bearing on the matter --  for a company to sell securities when the 
company possesses less than the stipulated amount of capital, or for a company to use 
some other accounting practice for valuing inventories, or for a person to plant the 
species of tree that is mentioned as prohibited. (Although I do not think that people would 
view such conduct as intrinsically immoral, that is, as immoral were the conduct legal, 
individuals would be likely to think this conduct immoral just because it is illegal; there 
is a general moral duty to do what the law asks. I am, however, excluding this particular 
moral rule from consideration, for otherwise the question that I think it natural to 
examine here would be mooted.) 
Now let us consider whether the two conditions about gains and harm that I 
mentioned above hold in the domain at issue. Regarding the first, it is fairly clear that the 
private gains from undesirable conduct are frequently large enough that legal sanctions, 
as opposed to merely moral sanctions, are needed to obtain a tolerably good level of 
compliance with rules. Consider the often substantial gains that can be obtained from 
improper sale of securities, or from a self-serving choice of method for the valuation of 
inventories. Moreover, the actors whose conduct needs to be controlled are often firms, 
which, as noted, dilutes the force of moral sanctions. It seems doubtful on the whole that 
many of the regulations now enforced through use of the legal system, many times  
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through public enforcement effort and the threat of criminal sanctions, could be 
reasonably well enforced by moral sanctions alone.  
The second condition that we want to verify is that the harm that would follow 
from failure to comply with the rules in question would be substantial. This becomes 
evident from reflection on the purposes of the rules. Consider the minimum capital 
requirements for the registration of securities. If these are not met, there may ultimately 
be non-trivial consequences for the functioning of securities markets (for instance, 
erosion of investor confidence in the quality of securities). As the securities markets 
contribute greatly to the health and productivity of our economy, it is very valuable for 
the rules about the registration of securities to be satisfied. Likewise, if there are not 
uniform accounting rules for the valuation of inventories, investors and lenders will have 
to spend more time than they now do unraveling the meaning of financial statements, 
which would impede the functioning of our capital and credit markets. The general claim, 
in other words, is that our somewhat detailed technical rules are often like these 
examples; upon examination, one finds that they have real and significant rationales, and 
therefore that substantial social harm will result if they are violated. Thus, I have 
suggested that, when one considers the two conditions in the domain in question, it does 
indeed seem that legal rules are needed as a mechanism of control. 
The question remains, however, why morality is not desirable to employ as a 
supplement to the law in the domain we are discussing. For morality to function in this 
way, one approach that could be taken would be to teach as individual moral rules the 
various legal rules at issue. Thus, we could teach children that it would be immoral for a 
firm to sell securities unless the firm’s capital is higher than X, that it is immoral to plant 
species Y of tree, and so forth. But it is manifestly impractical to accomplish this task, 
and it would be nonsensical to think that we could, or would, try to instill rules like this in 
our children. The sheer number and the changing nature of the rules would bar our 
teaching them to children, and in any case the specific nature of the rules would often 
render them difficult for children to absorb (what does a child know about the sale of 
securities, particular species of trees, and so forth?).  
Another approach that society could employ to use morality to reinforce the law 
in the domain in question is to instill in children some overarching moral principle that, in 
its application by adults, would yield the many particular rules under consideration as 
subsidiary, implied moral rules. Arguably, the only overarching principle that could 
rationalize all these diverse rules is that of a general utilitarianism, of social welfare 
maximization. It does seem true that a form of this principle not only could be, but in fact 
is, imbued in us: the general obligation to do good, to do whatever it is that helps society. 
However, the force of this moral rule is attenuated when it is not clear how it applies, and 
this tends to be the case with regard to the legal rules under consideration; identifying 
them as being in the social interest involves a fairly complicated train of thinking. Recall 
the argument given above for why a firm ought to have at least X in assets before it can 
sell securities; the logic behind the social desirability of this rule is not transparent (it is 
far more complex than that behind the typical moral rule, such as that one ought not hit 
someone, or one ought not lie). In other words, I am suggesting that the only overarching 
moral rule that could resolve itself into the body of technical legal rules in question is the 
general moral rule to maximize social welfare, and while we do have this general rule 
instilled in us as a moral rule, it is rendered weak in the domain in question because it is  
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too difficult to apply, owing to our inability easily to recognize which of the technical 
rules are or are not in the social interest.
36 Thus, we must rely primarily on the law to 
induce compliance with such rules. 
 
3. Optimal Design of the Law Taking Morality into Account 
Having discussed in general terms the optimal domains of law and of morality, I now 
want to focus on the area of behavior in which both law and morality apply, and to 
examine the more specific question of how the law should be designed in the light of 
morality. For instance, how should tort liability be determined given our ideas of 
wrongful behavior?  Although it is this type of question that is the major issue below, I 
will also briefly consider, at the end (in section 3.5), the question of how law should be 
designed if it can influence morality. 
3.1 In general. In fashioning legal rules to maximize social welfare, the moral 
system must be taken into direct account to the extent that individuals have a taste for 
satisfaction of moral notions. That is, legal rules should be designed to maximize 
morally-inclusive social welfare. However, as I emphasized in section 5 of chapter 26, 
moral notions should not be given weight per se, independently of the importance 
individuals place on them as tastes, for that would lower social welfare. To appreciate the 
significance of these distinctions, it will be helpful to reconsider briefly several of the 
major subject areas of law examined in this book and to comment on how taking morality 
into account would, or would not, affect the previous analysis of them, which was based 
on conventional, not morally-inclusive, social welfare. 
3.2 Torts. The main notion of morality that bears on tort law appears to be that of 
classical corrective justice -- the wrongdoer must make his victim whole -- and it will 
serve my purposes to focus on this principle even though there are others, mainly 
subsidiary, that could be considered as well. The most natural interpretation of corrective 
justice is that the negligence rule should govern liability, for negligence connotes 
wrongful behavior. Conversely, strict liability would seem to be inconsistent with 
corrective justice, for it results in liability independently of whether a person has acted 
wrongly.
37 
How moral notions ought to be taken into account. Under the assumption just 
made about corrective justice, the negligence rule will be the optimal legal rule more 
often than I found it to be best under conventional measures of social welfare. In 
particular, where I suggested that the negligence rule was inferior to strict liability, due to 
excessive activity levels under the negligence rule (see chapter 8), the negligence rule 
might now be optimal because of the taste individuals have for it. Or individuals= taste for 
                                                 
36In fact, society is able to harness the general moral rule to do social good by 
making an act illegal. For then the rule is marked as likely to advance the social good. 
For example, an individual need not understand why selling securities without having 
capital of X is against the social interest; the fact that that is illegal conveys this to the 
individual.  
     
37There are other interpretations of corrective justice that might be advanced, under which, although 
negligence is usually the best rule, strict liability is said to be appropriate when activities impose unusual risks on 
others. However, the qualitative nature of the arguments I will make would not be altered were I to consider such 
an interpretation of corrective justice.  
Chapter 27 – Page 17 
the negligence rule might imply that that rule is best where, under conventional social 
welfare analysis, no liability would be desirable owing to the administrative costs of the 
liability system or its small effect on incentives.  
Individuals= taste for corrective justice might also affect the conclusions about the 
magnitude of damages, for corrective justice implies that damages should make the 
victim whole, but this was not always the result found earlier. For example, I said that 
damages received should usually be limited to monetary losses, and not compensate for 
nonmonetary losses (essentially because receipt of more money by the victim is not as 
beneficial as receipt of fine revenue by the state).
38 In such situations, the factor of 
corrective justice would lead to the desirability of raising damages paid to victims. There 
were other cases that I investigated in which the influence of corrective justice on optimal 
damages would be similar.
39 
The degree to which the conclusions reached under conventional social welfare 
maximization should be altered depends on the answer to the empirical question of the 
strength of individuals= tastes for corrective justice. In making a conjecture about that 
taste, the reader should bear in mind the point that in order to determine the importance 
of it, a person must be able to separate the functional value of corrective justice in 
reducing harm and in compensating victims from its other value. The mental experiment 
that this requires is not easy. One would have to answer questions such as the following: 
ASuppose that, under the negligence rule, society experiences the same number of 
accidents as it would under a no-fault system and that compensation of victims is also the 
same. How much would you be willing to pay each year to have the negligence rule 
govern, even though it has no effect on outcomes?@  It is not obvious to me how most 
people would answer such questions.  
Another problem in assessing the importance of corrective justice in the tort 
context concerns insurance. One needs to know how a person=s taste for satisfaction of 
corrective justice is influenced by the fact that judgments are usually paid by liability 
insurers rather than by wrongdoers, and by the fact that victims may well be compensated 
by their own first-party insurers, or that they would be in the absence of receipt of 
damage payments. 
How moral notions are actually taken into account. What the analyst should not 
do is ascribe importance to moral notions apart from their importance as tastes. This, 
however, seems widely to be done. It is typical for commentators (and others in general) 
to ascribe intrinsic significance to the negligence rule, or to whatever their preferred tort 
rule is. Commentators= statements are not represented as reflecting solely the functional 
values of tort rules and the tastes of the population for the rules. To be sure, the 
functionality of rules is usually mentioned by commentators, but it is only one part of the 
argument that they advance.  
Has social decisionmaking been harmed in a substantial way because of the view 
of commentators?  I think that the answer is yes. To illustrate, it seems to me possible 
that the general scope of tort liability is too great because of commentators= orientation. 
                                                 
     
38See section 6 of chapter 11. 
     
39For instance, I said that if administrative costs are high, it may be best not to estimate losses, and on certain 
further assumptions not to include certain components of loss in damages; see sections 7 and 8 of chapter 10.  
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For instance, in substantial domains that I noted  earlier, such as automobile accidents 
and product harms to consumers, the extent of liability may well be too wide:  First, tort 
liability may provide little deterrence (in the automobile case, because people worry 
about harm to themselves in the first place; in the product context, because reputational 
concerns of firms may lead them to take precautions in the absence of liability, and 
government could provide consumer information). Second, tort liability is very expensive 
as a means of compensation compared to the insurance system. Third, the true taste for 
tort liability may not be strong, and greatly compromised by the presence of insurance. In 
the face of this, why do we not have a more restricted set of circumstances in which 
liability is imposed?  An answer is that the tort system that we observe is the product of 
invocations of corrective justice by commentators, judges, and others of influence, rather 
than an objective assessment of its importance as a taste, set off against conventional 
social welfare considerations. Whether or not I am right about the conjecture that the 
degree to which we use tort liability is excessive is not really important. My true point is 
that I could be right: Because there is little real consideration given by commentators of 
the true instrumental benefits of liability, and no real attempt to assess the taste for 
corrective justice, errors in evaluation can be made. 
3.3 Contracts. The notion of morality that is most relevant in the context of 
contract law is that of promise-keeping: that it is right to keep promises and wrong to 
break them. The translation of this moral norm into contract law is that one is supposed to 
honor a contract and not breach it, and if one does breach it, that one should suffer a 
sanction. What this sanction should be, according to the promise-keeping norm, is not 
entirely clear, and some subsidiary principle has to be used to determine it. 
How moral notions ought to be taken into account. The way that this moral notion 
ought to be taken into consideration is that, whatever weight conventional analysis would 
lead one to accord to keeping contractual promises due to the instrumental benefits 
flowing from so doing, extra weight should be given to keeping such promises owing to 
the taste for promise-keeping. Second, whatever level of damages for breach of contract 
is best according to conventional analysis would be altered in the direction of the level of 
damages for which there is a taste.   
What do these general observations imply?  The answer depends on what the 
understanding of breaking a contract is to individuals. Consider the example of a contract 
that reads something like, “I will produce a machine for you.”  One understanding of 
breaking a contract, the standard one, is that if the machine is not delivered, then the 
contract is breached. Under this understanding of breach, the promise-keeping norm says 
that breach is wrong, and consequently should not come about. The implication of this 
view is that whatever level of damages I said was desirable is too low, for I said that 
breach of this type of contract is often desirable, and damages should be chosen so as to 
allow an escape hatch that will lead to breach whenever the cost of performance exceeds 
the value of performance; see chapters 13 and 15. This is why, in the paradigm case, I 
said that expectation damages are desirable; they lead to breach whenever the cost of 
performance exceeds its value to the promisor. Thus, the promise-keeping norm would 
lead us to say that damages should be higher than expectation damages, so as to lead to 
more frequent performance. 
The importance of this argument for raising damages above expectation damages 
depends on the true taste individuals have for keeping promises, and remarks analogous  
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to those above about the importance of corrective justice apply here. Namely, it is not 
clear that individuals have thought carefully about how important they believe promise-
keeping is, that their statements probably do not reflect a true parsing of the instrumental 
from the intrinsic importance of promise-keeping. I should observe also that, when 
individuals name liquidated damages for breach, such damages are often fairly low, and 
very often equal expectation damages, suggesting that individuals do not strongly want to 
induce promise-keeping, but rather to allow breach when the cost of performance would 
be excessive.  
Finally, let me comment that this discussion has been premised on the standard 
interpretation of breach, that not honoring the words of the contract is a breach.  
However, it is possible that a deeper view of a contractual arrangement is held by some 
individuals, under which the contract is interpreted in the way that I did in chapter 13. 
Namely, the contract is regarded as an incomplete promise, and it reads as it does only 
because of the inconvenience of writing a completely specified contractual promise. 
Under this view, the breach of the incomplete contract, such as “I will produce a machine 
for you,” is not a true breach. A true breach would be not honoring the completely 
specified contract that would have been written had the parties included all relevant 
contingencies. Under this completely specified contract, the obligation to produce the 
machine would hold only when production cost is less than the value of performance; 
otherwise there would be no obligation to produce it. Hence, the promise-keeping norm 
would turn out to imply that one should obey contracts and perform only if the cost of 
performance is below the value of performance, and thus would be consistent with the 
economic analysis of contracts. But this view of contracts and promises is not the one that 
is in fact held by very many individuals in my experience (even though I think it is the 
view that ought to be held).  
How moral notions are actually taken into account. In fact, the way that moral 
notions are taken into account in contract law has distinct aspects. First, the language of 
commentators suggests that breaking the agreements that are written, such as that I will 
produce a machine for you, is viewed as bad.
 40 Thus, we see criticism of the idea that it 
is permissible to break a contract as long as one pays damages. If, consistent with this 
view and the seeming strength with which it is often expressed, damages for breach were 
really high, or if specific performance were widely employed as a remedy, then contract 
law would be very different from what it is; contracts would be performed much more 
often, breach would be much less common than it is.    
This leads to the second point about moral notions and contract law. Namely, 
when it comes to damages, the commentators seem usually to endorse the view that 
damages should equal the expectation measure (or sometimes the reliance measure), not 
that damages should be so high as to induce performance.
41  Thus, there is tension 
between the commentators’ view that damages should be moderate but that contractual 
promises ought to be kept.  
                                                 
     
40See, for example, Barnett 1986 and Fried 1981; and see the views about promise-keeping of such 
philosophers as Kant [1785] 1997, 15,32,38, and Ross 1930, chapter 2. 
41For example, Fried 1981 endorses the expectation measure.   
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In any case, because of the opinion that damages should be moderate, there does 
not seem to be a general, socially disadvantageous effect on contract law flowing from 
the application of morality to it. However, there are many particular instances of socially 
undesirable aspects of contract law that are probably influenced by notions of morality, 
but these we will not discuss here.
42 
3.4 Public law enforcement and criminal law. The notion of morality that is 
most important in regard to public law enforcement and crime is retributivist, that 
wrongdoing merits punishment, and the punishment should be in proportion to the 
gravity of the bad act. The proportion could be one to one, as under the biblical principle 
of an eye for an eye, or different, typically higher. Of significance is that the level of 
punishment depends on the degree of wrongfulness of the act and not on other factors, 
notably, not on the likelihood of punishment or on the cost of imposing it. 
How moral notions ought to be taken into account. Whatever was the optimal 
level of sanctions from the point of view of our previous analysis should be modified 
somewhat to reflect the taste for retributive justice. This might mean that the sanction 
should be lowered from what I suggested was optimal. This would be the case, 
importantly, where a low likelihood of catching violators and imposing sanctions on them 
leads to the desirability of sanctions substantially exceeding harm. Recall from chapters 
20 and 21 that we concluded that it is desirable for sanctions to equal the harm multiplied 
by the reciprocal of the probability of punishment (or something reflecting that in the 
case of nonmonetary sanctions), so that, for example, if the chance of being caught is one 
third, the sanction should equal three times the harm. This can easily lead to a level of 
sanctions exceeding that given by the proportionality criterion of retributive justice. For 
instance, the optimal sanction for tax cheating might be many times the understatement of 
the tax due, and the optimal sanction for stealing a car might be a significant number of 
years in jail. Taking account of the proportionality principle would reduce these 
conventionally optimal sanctions. 
Note, however, that if sanctions should be smaller than the conventionally optimal 
magnitude, due to our taste for retributively correct punishment, achieving more 
deterrence would require investing more resources in enforcement to catch violators of 
law.  If we can only impose a sentence of one year on a car thief even though a three year 
sentence would be more appropriate for purposes of preventing such theft, given the 
present probability of apprehension, we had best increase the likelihood of apprehension 
of car thieves even though that involves extra expense. This general implication of 
retributive tastes is of special note because, as I emphasized in earlier chapters, the nature 
of the conventionally optimal enforcement policy involves low likelihoods of catching 
violators to save enforcement resources, and accompanying high penalties to maintain 
deterrence. Retributivist tastes moderate the use of this strategy because these tastes 
increase the effective cost of raising penalties above a fair level. 
An opposite possibility, that retributive tastes might lead to higher sanctions than 
called for under the conventional social welfare calculus, arises in several circumstances. 
                                                 
     
42One important example is the notion that damages should not be altered from their fair level for reasons 
having to do with incentives. Thus, suppose that expectation damages are felt to be correct, but it turns out that 
breach (such as improper quality of service of the promisor) would often go undetected. In such a situation, the 
two parties might want to specify a multiple of expectation damages as liquidated damages in order to provide 
proper incentives to perform. This, though, might be seen as unfair and not honored as the measure of damages.  
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One is where individuals are certain to be caught and the correct proportion of 
punishment under retributivist principles exceeds one hundred percent. For instance, 
suppose a firm knowingly pollutes a lake, causing $1,000,000 of harm. Here the 
economically optimal fine is $1,000,000, but the retributively-best punishment is by 
hypothesis higher, such as $2,000,000. A closely related reason why the retributive 
punishment might exceed the economically appropriate one has to do not with the 
proportionality factor, but rather with the assessment of the gravity of the act. Although 
the harm caused by the pollution might be $1,000,000 and the proportionality factor 
might be one, the retributively best punishment might be $2,000,000 because the 
assessment of the gravity of the firm=s act might be high if the firm=s behavior had an 
outrageous aspect, for instance, if its employee was drunk. Another reason that the 
retributively appropriate punishment might exceed the economically optimal one is that 
the costs of imposing punishment might be too high to make any punishment, or much 
punishment, worthwhile, whereas retributivist principles are not influenced by the cost of 
punishment. 
How much the conventionally optimal punishments should be modified depends 
upon our taste for retributive justice, and it is hard to know what this is because of our 
ignorance of the degree to which individuals separate their desire for appropriate 
punishment from that for the consequences that punishment brings about, principally in 
terms of deterrence and incapacitation.  
How moral notions are actually taken into account. It appears to me that our 
notions of correct punishment have considerable effect on our punishment policy. 
Certainly this is clear from the rhetoric surrounding punishment. Many punishments are 
much lower than they ought to be according to conventional economic thinking. The 
penalties for tax cheating are a good example; these are quite small, even though the 
chance of being found out for that misbehavior is slight. Likewise for many criminal acts, 
for automobile theft for example, sanctions may be inadequate given the likelihood of 
capture. Because the probability of catching many types of violations is so low, the 
needed sanctions for deterrence are often very high, come into conflict with our notions 
of fair punishment, and these notions are given substantial weight.  
If sanctions are inappropriately constrained by retributivist thinking -- more than 
is merited by our true tastes for retributivist principles -- then society suffers from a 
number of disadvantages. First, deterrence and incapacitation are too low, relative to 
what they ought to be. Second, expenditures on enforcement are greater than needed, 
because we are unwilling to raise sanctions in many areas, which would allow us to lower 
enforcement expenditures. Consider the enforcement of parking violations. If we were 
willing to double the magnitude of tickets for parking too long at a metered space from 
their usual level of about $20 to about $40, we could halve enforcement effort, which is 
substantial in our country, and use these freed resources in other areas, or save taxpayer 
money, without altering deterrence. While mundane, this example illustrates one way in 
which society is paying for its desire to employ proportionate sanctions. 
When the sanctions that are felt to be fair exceed those that make economic sense 
(rather than fall below the economically optimal sanctions), society also suffers a cost. 
Perhaps the best example is that of firms that cause harm and suffer large penalties, such 
as punitive damages, making their financial burden exceed harm done. What this  
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produces is excessive precautions, high product prices, and withdrawal of firms from 
socially valuable lines of business. 
These costs to society in terms of social welfare, conventionally measured, are the 
price we pay for proportionality of punishment. I have suggested that the costs are 
substantial, and that they are not warranted by the actual taste we have for 
proportionality. To know whether the conjecture is correct, we would have to assess the 
strength of that taste, something that, as with the other moral notions, has not been done 
to my knowledge. 
3.5 Influence of law on moral beliefs and their effectiveness. I noted above 
that, to some degree, the law can influence moral beliefs and that it can also alter their 
effectiveness by leading individuals to act on their beliefs to impose social sanctions on 
those who deviate from moral behavior. This has obvious implications for the design of 
the law, for it constitutes an effect of a legal rule that must be reckoned in the calculus of 
its design, along with other consequences. For example,  in assessing the desirability of 
passage of civil rights laws, one would take into account not only their direct effects on 
behavior, such as changes in the hiring practices of businesses to avoid liability, but also 
that the laws may serve to alter basic beliefs about race and individual rights, as well as 
the willingness of individuals to admonish those who discriminate.
43  However, one 
suspects that in most instances, unlike in that of the civil rights laws, the influence of a 
legal rule on moral beliefs is a minor, if nonexistent, factor.  
 
4. The Nature of Normative Discourse about Law and Morality 
What has been suggested above to be the proper approach to understanding the 
relationship between law and morality, and especially how best to design the law, is quite 
different from the approach to these issues that is commonly found, whether in the 
classroom, scholarly journals, legal opinions, or other forums. Here I want to characterize 
briefly salient aspects of the normative discourse about law and morality that we 
encounter, contrast it with the welfare economic view, and attempt to explain why the 
nature of actual normative discourse is what it is. This will help to reconcile the 
differences that exist between the usual normative views and the welfare economic view, 
and I hope will lead the reader in the direction of endorsement of the welfare economic 
view. 
4.1 Characteristics of observed discourse. Normative discourse about law and 
morality appears to have three general characteristics. The first is that independent weight 
is given to moral factors. For example, when crime is discussed, the blameworthiness of 
criminals and the proportionality of punishment are typically accorded independent 
importance, or when the subject of torts is addressed, corrective justice and compensation 
of victims are accorded significance of their own. The second characteristic is that the 
moral factors typically are not adequately distinguished from the instrumental ones. For 
instance, when a person says that punishment for car theft ought to be a five year 
                                                 
     
43Of course, a necessary part of this calculus is evaluation of the social value of the changed moral beliefs 
themselves. In essence, such evaluation involves taking into account the direct effect on utility of the moral 
beliefs (consisting of the experience of virtue for doing right, here of not discriminating, or of guilt for doing, 
wrong, and of associated feelings with respect to giving praise or admonishing others), and taking into account 
the indirect effects due to behavioral changes induced by the moral beliefs. 
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sentence, it will be unclear to what extent this reflects the person’s view of just 
punishment and to what extent it is based on his judgment about conventional economic 
factors, notably, deterrence, incapacitation, and enforcement costs. The third 
characteristic of observed normative discourse is that it is generally not neutral in its tone. 
When individuals debate issues of legal policy, their interchanges frequently include 
elements of moral suasion. I am certain that the reader has seen that when a person 
advances a right as a reason for this or that legal policy, the person typically evinces 
feelings of virtue on his own part -- in his tone of voice, in his rhetorical and expressive 
style. Likewise, if a contrary view is advanced by another person, that person is subjected 
to attack, and certain types of social sanctions are imposed that are not entirely dissimilar 
to those experienced by individuals who have acted immorally in reality. In other words, 
the person advancing a morally incorrect legal policy is subjected to a translated form of 
the social sanction that he would suffer if he had actually acted immorally. 
4.2 Chief difference between observed normative discourse and the proper 
normative view. Perhaps the principal difference between what we encounter in 
observed normative discourse about law and morality and the views that I have been 
expressing is that the psychological aspects of morality and the instrumental role of moral 
notions are generally ignored in the observed discourse. In this discourse, there is usually 
no acknowledgment made  of the point that individuals have tastes for satisfaction of 
notions of morality and that the notions may serve to promote social welfare.  
4.3 Explanation for the difference. It is not mysterious that there should be this 
difference. Since we care about adherence to moral notions, at least if we are well-
socialized individuals, it is natural for us to import our feelings about them into the realm 
of analytical discussion. Suppose that we believe that there should be no punishment 
without fault and that punishment should be in proportion to the gravity of bad acts. Then 
if one of us becomes a legal academic, or an editorialist for a newspaper, it might be 
expected that we would carry our views into our professional writing concerning legal 
policy. This simple observation also helps to explain the non-neutral character of 
observed discourse about normative legal issues. 
By contrast, the view of morality that I have been advancing is not a natural one 
for individuals to hold. For it requires us to place ourselves on the psychiatrist=s couch in 
order to examine why we ascribe the importance that we do to moral notions. Because 
this is a difficult exercise, it is not entirely surprising that it is so infrequently done. Yet it 
is somewhat surprising that academics have paid so little attention to the view advanced 
here, for it is in many respects a well-known view. Famous philosophers have developed 
important elements of the view of morality presented here -- I refer especially to Hume 
([1751] 1998), Smith ([1790] 1976), and Mill ([1861] 1998), and more recently to such 
writers as Hare (1981).  
4.4 Conclusion. My conclusion is that welfare economics, as described in the 
previous chapter and this one, provides an intellectually attractive and generally 
satisfactory lens for understanding and analyzing morality and law, in part because 
welfare economics allows one to pass behind the veil of morality into an inquiry about its 
functions and origins. Although I realize that this view is in tension with the great weight 
of authority, it is the only one that I can comfortably endorse, and I hope that the reader 
appreciates its value, even if the reader does not come to accept it. 




  INCOME DISTRIBUTIONAL EQUITY AND THE LAW  
 
Let me now turn to the topic of the distribution of income and the legal system. Here the 
question to be addressed is how the effects of legal rules on the distribution of income 
should influence the choice of legal rules. I will first review how the distribution of 
income enters into the determination of social welfare, and also how the income tax and 
transfer system can be utilized to achieve income distributional objectives. Then I will 
discuss the influence of legal rules on the distribution of income and whether the choice 
of legal rules should be influenced by their distributional effects. The main point will be 
that income distributional objectives are best pursued through the use of the income tax 
and transfer system, implying that legal rules should be selected on the basis of objectives 
apart from the distributional.
44 
 
1. The Distribution of Income and Social Welfare 
Most concerns about the overall distribution of income can be accommodated by, and are 
embodied in, the measures of social welfare of conventional welfare economics, as was 
mentioned in section 1 of chapter 26. In particular, there are three channels through 
which the distribution of income may influence social welfare.  
First, the distribution of income may matter to social welfare because the poor 
may value a dollar more than the rich -- the marginal utility of a dollar to a poor person is 
likely to exceed the marginal utility of a dollar to a rich person. If so, social welfare will 
tend to be increased by redistributing income from the rich to the poor.
45   
Second, the distribution of income may matter to social welfare because the 
distribution of income affects the distribution of utility, and under the welfare economic 
approach social welfare may depend directly on how equally utility is distributed among 
individuals. Thus, even if the rich and the poor obtain the same marginal utility from a 
dollar, it may be desirable to redistribute from rich to poor because the rich enjoy greater 
overall utility.
46 
                                                 
     
44The questions discussed in this chapter are ones that fall under the head of conventional welfare economics, 
and do not involve issues of morality in the sense in which I have used this term in previous chapters. 
Nevertheless, because the distribution of income is usually described using words such as “equity” and 
“fairness,” it seems natural to treat the relation between law and income distribution in this part of the book. 
     
45For example, consider the classical utilitarian social welfare function, the sum of utilities. Under it, 
redistributing a dollar from a rich individual with a low marginal utility of income to a poor individual with a 
high marginal utility of income will raise social welfare, for the utility of the rich individual will fall by less than 
the utility of the poor individual will rise, meaning that total utility will be greater.  
     
46Suppose that social welfare equals the sum of the square roots of utility (this is a social welfare function 
under which more equal distributions of utility are desirable; see note 5 of chapter 26). Suppose also that the 
utility of a person equals simply his level of wealth (so that the marginal utility of a dollar is 1, regardless of 
whether a person is rich or poor). Now consider two individuals, one who has wealth of $100 and the other 
wealth of  $1,000, and suppose that $100 is transferred from the wealthy person to the poor person, so that the 
former is left with $900 and the latter possesses $200. The $100 gain by the poor person raises his utility by 100, 
which is exactly the loss in utility for the rich person, so the redistribution does not lead to any change in the sum 
of utilities. Yet, because the redistribution makes the distribution of utilities more equal, it raises social welfare:  
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Third, the distribution of income may matter to social welfare because an 
individual=s utility may depend on the distribution of income in the population at large, 
owing to generalized feelings of altruism or of sympathy. Thus, even if the rich and the 
poor obtain the same direct marginal utility from a dollar, and even if social welfare 
equals the sum of utilities and thus does not depend in an intrinsic way on the distribution 
of utility, it may still be true that social welfare may rise if the distribution of income is 
more equal.
47 
In what follows, it will not be important to refer to the particular source of 
importance of the distribution of income to social welfare; I will simply assume that the 
distribution of income enters into the determination of social welfare. 
 
2. The Income Tax System, Income Distribution, and Social Welfare  
2.1 The income tax system. By the income tax and transfer system is meant the 
combined effect of the various taxes (federal, state, and local) on income, together with 
programs (such as Medicare, food stamps) that effect transfers of money to individuals 
based upon their income. For brevity, I will speak of these taxes and transfers simply as 
the income tax system. 
There are two chief purposes of the income tax system: to raise revenues for 
purposes of the state, and to redistribute income.
48  The second purpose may not seem 
important to some readers, perhaps because few individuals receive outright transfers and 
because there is relatively little frank discussion in public forums of the tax system as a 
means of redistribution. However, a moment=s reflection makes one realize that the tax 
system does in fact possess substantial redistributive effects -- the situation of many 
individuals, especially of the poor and of the rich, is changed significantly by the 
existence of the tax system and government activity, and it is certainly clear that the tax 
system can be used to redistribute. 
                                                                                                                                                 
social welfare is originally %100 + %1,000 = 10 + 31.62 = 41.62, and rises after the redistribution to %200 + %900 
= 14.14 + 30 = 44.14. 
     
47For example, suppose that the utility of each person equals the sum of two components: his own wealth 
(which he spends on personal consumption), and the sum of the square roots of the utilities of all individuals  
(that is, the measure of social welfare discussed in the previous note). Notice, therefore, that the direct marginal 
utility of a dollar for a person is 1, regardless of his wealth, for the first component of utility is equal to his 
wealth; but the utility of a person also depends on the distribution of utilities in the population through the second 
component of his utility. Suppose too that social welfare is utilitarian, the sum of utilities, so that, as stated in 
text, social welfare is insensitive in a direct sense to the distribution of utilities. Then, as stated in the text, social 
welfare rises if wealth is more equally distributed because that tends to raise individuals= utilities, and thus the 
sum of utilities, for the individuals= utilities (as opposed to social welfare) depend on the distribution of utilities 
and thus on the distribution of wealth. For instance, suppose that, initially, one person has wealth of  0 and the 
other 1,000. The utility of the first person is 0 + %1,000 = 31.62, and that of the second is 1,000 + %1000 = 
1,031.62, so, considering these two people, social welfare is 1,063.24. If wealth is redistributed so each person 
has 500, the utility of each is 500 + 2%500 = 500 + 2(22.36) = 544.72, so social welfare is 1,089.44, which is 
higher. 
     
48When I say redistribute income, I mean to include wealth as well as income.  
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2.2 The income tax system and optimal redistribution. To see how the income 
tax system can be employed to redistribute income, let us suppose for simplicity that 
redistribution is its sole purpose (that is, let us abstract from the government’s need to 
raise revenue) and consider the following problem: Design the income tax system to 
maximize social welfare, assuming that the measure of social welfare is one that favors 
equality of income; thus, if a fixed amount of income exists to be divided, the best way to 
divide it would be equally.
49 
To solve this problem, suppose first that the income that each individual earns is 
fixed in quantity. Then, the total income of individuals is obviously fixed, implying that 
the optimal income tax would be designed so as to give all individuals an equal income, 
namely, the average income. If, for instance, the average income were $20,000, then any 
person earning over $20,000 would pay in taxes the excess earned over $20,000, so that 
he would be left with $20,000, and any person earning less than $20,000 would receive 
enough to bring him up to $20,000. Thus, the income tax would be employed to achieve 
the ideal distribution of income, and associated with it, the ideal level of social welfare. 
There are, however, two important reasons why the income tax system cannot 
achieve the ideal level of social welfare. One concerns the administrative costs of 
taxation. Suppose that transferring a dollar among individuals via the tax system involves 
an administrative cost (because individuals have to fill out tax forms, incomes must be 
verified to combat evasion, and so forth). Then it is clear that the social welfare-
maximizing income tax system will not result in an equal distribution of income, for that 
would involve too great a loss due to administrative costs. In general, the optimal income 
tax system will strike an implicit balance between the social benefits of redistribution and 
the administrative costs of redistribution; therefore, the level of redistribution and social 
welfare achieved will fall short of the ideal. This point may be helpfully described in 
terms of the metaphor of a leaky bucket: When transferring income in buckets for the 
purpose of redistribution, some income leaks from the buckets and is wasted, so it is not 
desirable to carry as much in buckets as society otherwise would want. Another metaphor 
is that the size of the pie to be divided among the population, that is, the sum of incomes, 
shrinks when the pie is divided. 
The second reason why the income tax system cannot be employed to achieve the 
ideal level of social welfare through redistribution concerns distortion of work incentives. 
Although it was assumed in the previous paragraphs that the earnings of each individual 
were fixed, this is unrealistic, and let us now assume that a person=s earnings depend on 
how hard he works and on his ability. In this situation, the income tax may alter work 
incentives and thus earnings. Notably, a person who has to pay a substantial percentage 
of earnings in taxes, such as 50 percent, may well work less hard, and earn less, than if he 
paid no income taxes; and a person who will receive a payment if his earnings fall below 
some threshold might have diluted incentives to work relative to what they would be if he 
would not receive this payment. Hence, the use of the income tax to redistribute may lead 
to a reduction in work effort and earnings, and through this route, reduce the total amount 
of income available to redistribute. Therefore, when one takes into account how the 
income tax influences work incentives in solving for the optimal income tax, it turns out 
                                                 
     
49One measure of social welfare under which this would be so is, as mentioned, the sum of the square roots of 
utilities; see note 3 above.  
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that the level of redistribution and social welfare falls short of the ideal.
50  In a rough 
sense, the reason is similar to that due to administrative costs; the distortion of incentives 
is in effect another source of leakage from the buckets used to redistribute. 
A comment about the work incentive factor should be made. Economists 
sometimes emphasize the point that this problem can be viewed as due to inability of the 
tax authorities to determine the inate ability to earn of individuals. The reason is that if a 
person=s ability to earn could be observed, the tax could be based on this ability and not 
on actual income earned. For instance, a person who has the ability to earn $100,000 a 
year and who would earn this amount in an ideal world, and for whom in that world the 
ideal tax would be, say, $50,000, would face an unconditional flat tax of $50,000, not a 
tax based on income earned. Hence, he would not have a disincentive to earn, because he 
would face the $50,000 tax based on his ability and could not escape the tax by working 
less hard. In reality, however, government cannot observe innate ability and earning 
capacity, and it must largely base taxes on earned income.
51  
In summary, then, we can say that the optimal use of the income tax to 
redistribute income does not lead to an ideal distribution of income because of two costs 
associated with redistribution: administrative costs and the implicit costs of the dulling of 
work incentives. 
 
3. Effect of Legal Rules on the Distribution of Income 
3.1 In general. It is clear that legal rules generally affect the distribution of 
income. If we trace out the consequences of any legal rule for each income class, we can 
determine its effects. Consider, for example, a rule that makes owners of large 
recreational boats liable for harms they negligently cause. This rule leaves the large 
recreational boat owners less well off both because they will be led to spend on safety 
equipment and to take precautions that they would not otherwise have taken, and because 
they will have to pay for any negligently caused accidents that still result; and it will 
benefit possible victims, including small boat owners and swimmers, because they will 
suffer from accidents less often and, if involved in accidents, will sometimes be able to 
                                                 
     
50This problem was first formally studied by Mirrlees 1971 and emphasized by Vickrey 1947; it has been 
developed in a vast literature known as the “optimal income tax literature.”  In this literature, the standard model 
is as follows. Each individual has an unobservable-to-the-government ability to work a. His earnings y equal aw, 
where w is work effort (thus, the higher his ability, the more he earns), where w is also unobservable. Work effort 
involves an effort cost to him of c(w). He pays an income tax t(y), which could be negative (corresponding to 
receipt of money). Thus, an individual will choose work effort w to maximize his net utility: y ! t(y) !  c(w) = aw 
!  t(aw)!  c(w). Clearly, the individual=s choice of w will depend on the tax schedule t(y), and it will also 
generally depend on his ability a. Denote this net utility of a person of ability a who chooses his work effort 
given the tax schedule t by u(a,t), and denote the person=s choice of work effort by w(a,t). The problem of the 
government is to choose the income tax schedule, that is the function t(y), so as to maximize social welfare, 
subject to the constraint that taxes collected sum to zero (that is, what is collected equals what is given out). 
Social welfare can be expressed as IW(u(a,t))f(a)da, where f(a) is the probability density of individuals of ability 
a. The condition that taxes net to zero is It(aw(a,t))f(a)da = 0. 
     
51Society can and sometimes does base income taxes on certain observable indicators of earning capacity. For 
example, the blind have a lower earning capacity than those with sight, so we do not tax them as heavily (and 
perhaps there are other reasons why that makes sense as well). However, society does not make use of all 
observable indicators of earnings capacity, such as educational attainment. Using that factor might be 
undesirable; for instance, it would discourage educational attainment, and this has benefits to individuals apart 
from how it raises earning power. In any event, I will abstract from such considerations in the text.  
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collect. Because the large recreational boat owners will tend to be a wealthy class, and 
their potential victims will not, the rule will redistribute from rich to poor; a refined 
understanding of this effect could be ascertained from data on who purchases large 
recreational boats and from data on victims of accidents. In such a manner, the influence 
of any legal rule on the income distribution can be determined. 
3.2 Comments. Several remarks about the assessment of the distributional effects 
of legal rules are worth bearing in mind.  
Diffused effects. Although in the example concerning recreational boats, the 
distributional effects of the legal rule might be fairly clear, because the injurers and the 
victims might be expected to comprise reasonably distinct income groups, that is not 
always so. Consider, for example, the effects of use of the negligence rule for accidents 
involving cars and pedestrians. This rule of liability imposes costs on drivers and it 
benefits pedestrians, but drivers constitute an extremely diverse group by income, and so 
do pedestrians. Moreover, drivers and pedestrians are not even distinct groups -- most 
drivers sometimes walk and most pedestrians sometimes drive. Thus, the distributional 
effects of the legal rule concerning drivers and pedestrians might be quite diffuse. 
Attenuated effects in contractual contexts. Another general observation about 
distributional effects is that if legal rules affect parties who are in a contractual 
arrangement with each other, the effects may be muted or even eliminated by changes in 
contract prices. Suppose that a legal rule that increases liability of manufacturers of a 
product for harms to buyers raises their liability-related unit costs by $100, and benefits 
buyers by this amount because they collect the $100 in expected liability payments. If the 
price of the product did not rise, buyers would be better off and a redistribution would 
have resulted. But, of course, prices will tend to rise, and in a competitive market they 
would rise fully by $100, negating the redistributive effect. It is true that price changes do 
not always offset the influence of legal rules on prices, but the point here is that there is a 
significant difference in the distributional effects of legal rules in contractual contexts 
from the effects in noncontractual settings. 
Interrelated nature of, and totality of, effects of different legal rules. Two further 
comments should be made. First, the change brought about by a legal rule will often 
depend on other legal rules. For example, the effect of holding drivers liable for 
negligently caused accidents to pedestrians will depend on speed limits and other traffic 
laws (the more rigorous they are, the less the influence of the negligence rule) and on 
legal regulation of vehicle manufacturers (for instance, requiring side-view mirrors on 
cars, or devices that make beeping sounds when trucks are put into reverse). Second, the 
income distribution is determined by the totality of effects of different legal rules, many 
of which work counter to one another. Thus, although car owners may suffer because an 
antipollution statute requires expensive pollution control devices in cars and raises their 
prices, car owners may benefit from reduced pollution, and also from other legal rules, 
such as antitrust rules. In strict logic, the distribution of income is the resultant of the 
whole legal system, not only of the legal rules that we might think of as variable because 
they are in flux or are under consideration for modification, but of the whole background 
of legal rules of property, contract law, criminal law, and so forth that we view as stable 
and that order our society.  
 
4. Should Income Distributional Effects of Legal Rules Influence Their Selection?    
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4.1 The general answer is in the negative: Given the availability of the income 
tax system for achieving distributional goals, legal rules should not be chosen on the 
basis of their distributional effects. Because society possesses the income tax system 
for attaining income distributional goals, legal rules do not need to be chosen with these 
goals in mind. In particular, if there is an affirmative reason to effect further 
redistribution from the rich to the poor, society can do this with an appropriate 
adjustment to the income tax, rather than through adoption of this or that legal rule. 
Moreover, if a legal rule happens to have an undesirable redistributive effect, harming the 
poor and benefiting the rich, that can be counterbalanced by a suitable change in the 
income tax system, helping the poor and harming the rich. Thus, there is no evident need 
to take distributional considerations into account in selecting legal rules. 
Further, if distributional considerations were taken into account in choosing legal 
rules, society would be led to compromise the social benefits that the rules generate, such 
as lowering the total costs of accidents. Hence, it is not only that distributional effects of 
the choice of legal rules do not need to be taken into account, it is also that social welfare 
would be lowered by taking those effects into account in the selection of legal rules. 
Indeed, it can be demonstrated that if distributional effects do influence the choice of a 
legal rule, it would be possible to make all individuals better off by altering the choice of 
rule to the otherwise optimal rule and by making an appropriate change in the income tax 
system.
52  
In view of the importance of this argument against choosing legal rules on the 
basis of their distributional effects, it is worth considering various complicating factors in 
the following sections. 
4.2 Speed of adjustment of the income tax system. Although undesirable 
distributive aspects of legal rules can be offset by adjustments in the income tax system, 
it might take time for the tax system to adjust, and in the period before adjustment, social 
welfare would suffer. This speed of adjustment factor, then, could in principle lead one to 
take distributive effects of legal rules into account. Yet it is not obvious why we should 
expect the income tax system to be slow to adjust, and in fact, it seems to be under more 
or less constant modification. 
4.3 Adjustment of the income tax system to specific legal rules. A closely 
related consideration that is sometimes mentioned is that the tax system cannot 
practically be adjusted to offset the undesired distributional effects of specific legal rules. 
                                                 
52 A simple version of the argument is illustrated as follows. Consider a world with two equally 
numerous income classes, rich and poor; a conventionally optimal rule of tort liability that lowers expected 
accident losses net of costs of precautions by $20 per person, which is as much as possible, and that 
otherwise leaves incomes unaffected; and a second liability rule that lowers net accident losses by only $10 
per person but that reduces the wealth of each rich person by $50 and raises the wealth of each poor person 
by $50. Suppose that the second rule is selected because its distributional effects are preferred. Our claim is 
that all individuals can be made better off if, instead, the optimal rule is chosen.  In particular, suppose that, 
in place of the second rule, the first is chosen and income taxes are raised by $50 on the rich and lowered 
by $50 on the poor. Then  each poor person is better off under the optimal rule than under the other rule, for 
the reduction by $50 in income taxes compensates for the loss of the $50 benefit from the rule, and his 
accident losses fall by $20 instead of only by $10. Likewise, each rich person is better off under the optimal 
rule, for the increase by $50 in income taxes is offset by the $50 benefit from the optimal rule, and his 
accident losses fall by $20 instead of only by $10. This argument is easily shown to hold generally where 
incomes of individuals are fixed, rather than a function of work effort, but it carries over to the latter setting 
as well; see section 4.6 below.  
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Hence, it is asserted, there is some reason for the distributional effects of the choice of a 
legal rule to be taken into account in its selection. This line of thinking, however, is 
insufficiently articulated to be well understood, and when one attempts to amplify it, one 
is left wondering about its meaning. For example, an important reason why it would be 
impractical to alter the tax system in response to each and every choice of legal rule is 
that some administrative cost is involved in so doing; another reason is that different legal 
rules often have counterbalancing effects, so that it may be desirable to wait for some 
period to see their cumulated effect before adjusting the tax system. But both of these 
reasons would also apply to a court or a legislature in designing legal rules. They would 
face administrative costs in determining the distributional effects of legal rules, and they 
would need to assess the cumulated effect of different rules, not just an isolated rule at a 
moment in time. 
4.4 Administrative costs. Administrative cost considerations may bear on the 
comparison of legal rules and the income tax system for the purpose of altering the 
distribution of income. If it were the case that legal rules allowed income to be 
redistributed more cheaply than the income tax system does, then the conclusion that 
legal rules should not be chosen on the basis of their redistributive effects would not 
necessarily hold. Conversely, if it were the case that legal rules involve greater 
administrative costs in connection with redistribution than the income tax system, the 
conclusion that legal rules should not be selected on the basis of distributional effects 
would be reinforced.  
The question at issue, therefore, is how the administrative costs of legal rules and 
of the income tax system compare, and several remarks can be made about this. First, the 
administrative costs of the income tax system (as distinct from distortions in work effort 
that it causes) are not negligible, probably more than 5 percent of dollars collected.
53  
Second, the administrative costs of redistribution through use of legal rules should be 
divided into two components. One is the administrative cost of redistribution through 
litigation and settlement, and, as discussed earlier in chapter 12, this is very high, on the 
order of 100 percent. But the other way that legal rules redistribute is through effects on 
behavior, for instance, by inducing injurers to take precautions. This would not usually 
seem to involve such substantial administrative costs. The administrative costs of 
redistribution through use of legal rules is thus some compound of high expense and low, 
and depends on the rule in question. 
4.5 Multiplicity of legal rules. A factor that supports the general argument 
against use of legal rules to redistribute income is the numerousness of legal rules, for 
this complicates the task of assessing their distributive effects. If legal rules were chosen 
individually, on the basis of their particular effects on income distribution, needless social 
losses would result, especially because of failure to take into account the offsetting 
effects of different rules.
54  Because legal rules are affected by different legislative bodies 
                                                 
     
53See Slemrod and Bakija 2000, 134-38, for estimates of the costs to government and to taxpayers of the tax 
collection process.   
     
54For example, suppose that initially, the distribution of income is thought to be desirable and at time 1, there 
is a choice between two rules A1 and B1, where A1 is superior on nondistributional grounds but would favor the 
rich. Hence, the rule B1 might be chosen if distribution is taken into account, so that the rich do not become 
richer. Suppose too that at time 2, there is a choice between between two rules, A2 and B2, where A2 is superior 
on nondistributional grounds and favors the poor. At this time, we could imagine that B2 might be chosen, to  
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and are also shaped by courts, one does not have confidence that the choice of legal rules 
to accomplish distributional objectives is, or would be, done in an integrated way that 
reflects the summed influence of different rules. 
4.6 Distortion of work effort under the income tax and consequent less-than-
ideal income distribution. As explained above in section 2.2, the income tax distorts 
work effort, and as a result, the distribution of income that results under the optimal 
income tax system involves inequality; although an equal distribution of income may be 
possible to achieve, it is generally not optimal because it would dilute work incentives 
too much. This raises the question of whether legal rules should be selected in part so as 
to bridge the gap between the distribution under the income tax and what is socially ideal. 
Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, the answer to the question is no; it remains true that 
legal rules should not be selected on the basis of distributional effects.  
The kernel of the explanation is that if legal rules are chosen to redistribute, this 
too will distort work effort. If, for instance, those who earn an extra $1,000 know that 
they will pay $500 more due to legal rules (say they will pay more in tort damages if they 
are held liable), then this will reduce their incentive to earn the $1,000 just as much as if 
they had to pay $500 more in income taxes. Whether it is the income tax arm of 
government or the judicial arm that takes the $500 is of no consequence to a person; it is 
the fact that earning $1,000 more will result in $500 of that amount being taken that 
reduces the person=s incentive to work. Using legal rules to redistribute income distorts 
work incentives just as much as the income tax does. But using legal rules to redistribute 
also tends to interfere with achievement of the beneficial purposes of the legal rules, 
notably in channeling behavior. Hence, it is best to use legal rules to achieve the 
beneficial purposes for which they are directly intended, and not to select them on the 
basis of their distributional effects. 
I should add for clarity that this point has been formally established in a version 
of the standard model of the income tax and distortion of work effort. In that model, the 
following conclusion (an extension of the conclusion mentioned in section 4.1) holds:  
Suppose that there is an income tax system in place and that a legal rule that is not 
conventionally optimal has been selected. If that rule is replaced by the conventionally 
optimal legal rule and the income tax system is suitably modified, all individuals will be 
made better off. This conclusion is stronger than what was discussed in the previous 
paragraphs of this section in that it states that all individuals can be made better off if 
legal rules are not selected on the basis of distributional considerations.
55 
                                                                                                                                                 
prevent the previously corrected income distribution from being again upset. Thus, we could imagine two 
inferior choices of rule, favoring B1 and B2, even though the superior rules, A1 and A2, have opposite 
distributional effects that would be exactly offsetting. 
     
55This result is first shown in Shavell 1981 and is amplified and discussed in Kaplow and Shavell 1994c; it 
builds on a result in the optimal income tax literature shown in Hyllund and Zeckhauser 1979. The model used in 
Shavell and in Kaplow and Shavell is that of the optimal tax literature, as described in note 7 above, but in which 
there is included as well an activity controlled by a legal rule. Specifically, individuals choose a variable x called 
care that reduces harm to others h(x) but that involves disutility d(x) to them. The legal rule imposes a liability 
cost l(x) on them. Let l*  be the “efficient” legal rule -- that which results in minimization of  h(x) + d(x) summed 
across the population. And let t be any income tax schedule. Now let lN  be any alternative legal rule that is not 
efficient -- such as one chosen because of its distributional characteristics. Then there exists a modified tax 
schedule tN  such that, under tN and the efficient legal rule l*, all individuals are better off than they are under t 
and the inefficient rule lN.  As we discuss in Kaplow and Shavell 1994, this conclusion does depend on a  
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4.7 Political process that determines the income tax is not socially desirable. 
One occasionally encounters the argument that the income tax is set by an imperfect 
political process and that, as a consequence, the income tax schedule does not lead to 
optimal redistribution. Therefore, the argument continues, legal rules should be chosen at 
least in part on the basis of their distributive aspects, so as to correct for the problem with 
the political process. This argument, however, overlooks the ability of those with political 
power to neutralize attempts by those controlling legal rules to redistribute income. If 
legal rules were used in an attempt to take more from the rich and give to the poor, one 
presumes that those who control the income tax could offset this effect by reducing tax 
rates on the rich to compensate them for the extra burden they suffer under the legal 
system. Thus, in the end, those who would choose inefficient legal rules in order to 
redistribute income would only cause a loss in social welfare and not accomplish 
additional redistribution. If, however, one assumes that the political process is not only 
imperfect in failing to achieve society=s redistributive goals, but also imperfect in failing 
to offset attempts to redistribute through the choice of legal rules, the argument just stated 
would not apply. 
4.8 Conclusion. The initial point made here that legal rules should not be selected 
on the basis of their income distributional effects is somewhat qualified, and is in certain 
respects reinforced, by consideration of a number of factors that bear on it. In particular, 
we found that where the administrative costs of the income tax system exceed those of 
legal rules as a means of transferring income, then legal rules might be selected on the 
basis of their distributional effects; and that if the speed of adjustment of the tax system 
were slow, the same might be said. The reader may judge for himself or herself the 
relevance of these two points. We also found that the multiplicity of legal rules and the 
need to coordinate responses to them argues against selecting rules on the basis of their 
distributional effects; that the distortion of work effort under the income tax is also a 
disadvantage of redistribution through legal rules, and so does not alter our initial 
conclusion; and finally that asserted defects in the political process also do not alter our 
basic conclusion that legal rules should not be selected on distributional grounds. 
                                                                                                                                                 
separability assumption about the disutility of work effort and of the functions determining accidents. That 
assumption seems the natural one to consider as a benchmark for thinking. In any case, were the assumption 
relaxed, although the optimal legal rule would not in general be the efficient one, there is no reason for the 
optimal rule to be such that it would redistribute toward the poor. On the latter issues, see Sanchirico 2000 and 
Kaplow and Shavell 2000.  
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